



“YOU TAKE YOUR OATH ONLY ONCE:” CRIMEA, THE BLACK SEA FLEET, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG RUSSIAN OFFICERS

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The Soviet military officer's motto was “I serve the Soviet Union.” He had taken an oath to a state whose leadership constantly stressed the ethnic diversity of its population. When the USSR fell apart, however, only one of its 15 successor states—the Russian Federation—did not declare itself the homeland of one specific ethnic group. The reality of the divorce was difficult to grasp for many people in the former Soviet Union. In Russia, ideas of democracy and hopes for the future of the RSFSR as an independent state were standing strong. Not all the newly independent states would be missed; the Central Asian republics were widely seen as a culturally distant periphery tapping the RSFSR of resources. However, shedding off Kazakhstan, Belarus, and above all, Ukraine was a completely different story.

Ukraine had shared more than 300 years of history with Russia. Kiev was the cradle of old Rus and, as East Slavs, the Ukrainians were culturally very close to the ethnic Russians.¹ Furthermore, approximately 20% of Ukraine's population were ethnic Russians, and many more spoke the Russian language. In the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Ukrainians had been second only to the RSFSR and ethnic Russians in terms of dominance and perceived reliability on the part of the CPSU leadership. In the words of Roman Szporluk, Ukrainians and Belarusians are, unlike all the other formerly Soviet peoples, commonly perceived in Russia as being Russian, “not only by imperial or statist but also by historical and cultural/ethnic criteria.”²

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the newly found nationalism of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk constituted one of the major reasons for the break-up.³ Similarly, Ukraine's insistence on setting up its own forces, and employing a narrow definition of what should fall into the category of common CIS “strategic” forces comprised the most immediate reason for the failed attempts to keep the Soviet armed forces together. In short, the Ukrainian leadership demonstrated a striking disinterest in maintaining close links with Russia.

The object of analysis in this article is national sentiments in Russia as displayed within its armed forces in the first three years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The point of departure is the assumption that prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union there existed certain ideas in the RSFSR and among ethnic Russians about what the term “Russia” represented, and that these notions were severely challenged by the disintegration. The identities that came out of these ideas had not

been entirely stable during the Soviet years; however, they were still much more static during that period than during the *perestroika* and post-Soviet years. When identities remain unchallenged, they are typically subject to less conscious consideration, discussion, and renegotiation. When they are challenged, however, efforts will be made to clarify and sharpen them. When the challenge is mounted in the form of a break-up of a state, there will always be an “identity lag” following it. In other words, the people affected will need time to adjust their ideas about their country and their place in it. This type of process tends to take place under conditions of heated exchange in society, in which many different ideas are advocated and discussed.

This is the situation that Russians faced at the beginning of 1992: they were now living in a new state with a different political system, new (narrower) borders, a new (lesser) international status, and a more homogeneous ethnic composition. At this time, an already existing public debate that had emerged in the RSFSR about issues of national identity assumed acute significance. The new Russian Federation was in ethnic terms more “Russian” than the Soviet Union—approximately 82% of the population was ethnic Russian, whereas the figure for the USSR had been around 50%. In terms of territory, the state was still the world’s largest, spanning the same nine time zones the Soviet Union had. Consequently, defining the Russian Federation as a nation state of ethnic Russians seemed logical; however, as quickly became evident in the public debate, this idea about how to define the Russian Federation was not the only one. It soon became evident that not all participants in this debate considered the natural borders of an independent Russia to be identical to the ones of what had been the RSFSR. This Soviet republic, after all, had never before existed as an independent state.

Regarding the split between Russia and Ukraine, the pain inflicted on the Russian side was multiplied by the fact that the Crimean peninsula, a favorite USSR holiday resort and a place strongly connected with major moments in Russian history, was now part of Ukraine. Up until the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Crimea was an autonomous republic within the RSFSR. In June 1945, this status was annulled by a decree from the USSR Supreme Soviet, and until 1954 Crimea was an *oblast* within the RSFSR. Due to the fact that the borders between Soviet republics enjoyed little real significance, the CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev decided in the same year to transfer Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. The occasion was the 300th anniversary of Letman Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s alliance with the Russian tsar; Crimea was the birthday present. The Russians have since laid separate claim to the city of Sevastopol, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), alleging that by 1954 it had already been transferred to a special status within the RSFSR, and was therefore not part of the transfer.⁴ The fleet was one of the USSR’s four fleets, smaller than the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, but larger than the Baltic Fleet. By 1993, some 48,000 men served here.⁵

A number of scholars have emphasized conservatism and nationalism as typical traits of military officials, regardless of what regime they are employed.⁶ It seems

as if such strands of thought follow naturally from the type of job the servicemen are required to do, the dedication that it takes, and the type of organization that is almost universal among armies. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the 4.5 million servicemen of the world's largest army faced an extraordinary challenge to their established identities: their old state was replaced by 15 new ones, and, regardless of which state they ended up serving, it would differ dramatically from the USSR. Often, one would hear military men voice their distress by the phrase "You take your oath only once." If acting on convictions at odds with the new *status quo*, officers of the Red Army were in the position to make or break any attempt to alter the political and territorial order in the former USSR.

Looking specifically at the Russian armed forces, this article will point to some aspects of conservatism and national identity that indicate the existence of an identity lag. Thereafter, in its main section, the article will demonstrate how such sentiments were experienced during, as well as shaped by, the Russian–Ukrainian dispute over Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and the BSF between 1992 and early 1995.⁷ In the conclusion, I will summarize what I consider to be the mechanisms at play that served to reduce the identity lag by bringing the officers' image of "Russia" more into line with the new *status quo*.

In order to show the wider context of these processes, the discussion is introduced by a section on the political setting of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict in the Black Sea. This section will survey the policies of the Yeltsin regime and the Russian political opposition in this period, during which relations at times were so tense that an armed conflict between the two states was widely perceived as a real danger. First, however, a short chronology of relevant events will provide the necessary background to the discussion. I would like to emphasize that other dimensions of Russian–Ukrainian relations—including denuclearization of Ukraine, and economic relations—while being important issues in their own right, are not part of this discussion.

Chronology: Crimea and the BSF in Russian–Ukrainian relations 1992–1995

1991

- December: The presidents of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet republics sign the Slavic Accord, which later the same month is signed by eight other republics and establishes the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
- December: The Soviet Union ceases to exist.

1992

- January: Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk declares himself commander of all Soviet forces located on Ukrainian territory; a total of some 700,000 men. All

servicemen are ordered to swear an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Kravchuk also claims Ukrainian ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, which has its main base in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. Russian President Boris Yeltsin responds by claiming full Russian ownership of the fleet. Negotiations ensue over the division of the fleet, in which Russia speaks in favor of CIS joint ownership.

- January: the Supreme Soviet votes to examine the legality of the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian union republic.
- May: Russia's Supreme Soviet votes to rescind the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. Parliament's resolution is dismissed by Russia's president and Foreign Ministry.
- June: Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk agree to split the BSF evenly. Agreement is criticized in both states.
- August: Russia and Ukraine agree to remove the BSF from CIS command and, after 1995, divide it.

1993

- June: Russia and Ukraine agree to split the Fleet evenly, starting this same year. Details remain unresolved.
- July: Russia's Supreme Soviet declares Sevastopol a part of Russia. Again, the president and the Foreign Ministry (MID) distance themselves from the resolution.
- August: Ukrainian Prime Minister (later President) Kuchma first proposes a Russian leasing of Sevastopol.
- September: Kravchuk reportedly agrees to exchange most of Ukraine's share of the Fleet for debt release. Ukraine later denies that this was in fact formally fixed.

1994

- April: Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk agree to split the Fleet, after which Ukraine is to sell most of its share to Russia. The dispute over Russia's claim to bases in Sevastopol is still not resolved.

1995

- June: The presidents sign a new agreement, reiterating the principle that the fleet will be divided equally, and that Russia would thereafter buy most of Ukraine's share. This opens for the establishment of a Russian base in Sevastopol.⁸

The Political Setting: Losing the Empire

In the first few years following independence, the interests of the Russian Federation, as opposed to imperial nostalgia, were represented above all by the Foreign Ministry

(MID) under Andrey Kozyrev, and by President Yeltsin personally.⁹ To the radical reformers, maintaining the old empire was not an inherent value, but they instead maintained that Russia would be better off on its own, gaining in strength and recognition by achieving economic growth. To a majority of Russians, the liberals' preparedness to abandon territorial claims and focus on improving conditions within a core area was quite alien. As Vera Tolz has pointed out, only a few liberal members of Yeltsin's entourage—such as Yegor Gaidar, Galina Starovoitova, and Valeriy Tishkov—completely refrained from questioning the borders of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the USSR.¹⁰

The first year of the new Russian state was characterized by the remarkable influence that liberals enjoyed in the government. Presidential adviser Galina Starovoitova, who was mentioned as a potential civilian candidate for the post of minister of defense,¹¹ in January 1992 blamed not only the Ukrainians but also her own government for having taken "a good many imprudent steps." She said she could not "entirely agree" that the BSF should be under Russia's sole jurisdiction, and that Russia "could not" make any territorial claims on Ukraine.¹²

The role of Boris Yeltsin and the MID on the issue of Crimea has on the whole been that of a neutralizing force, often having to pacify reckless statements of other institutions and actors, including the parliament. From 1992 onward, Yeltsin and the MID repeatedly emphasized that Russia was not making any territorial claims on Ukraine. This position was also established in the agreement between Yeltsin and Kravchuk in Dagomys in June 1992, and subsequently repeated in later agreements. Yeltsin explicitly rejected the territorial claims made on Crimea and Sevastopol by the Supreme Soviet, the State Duma, and the Federation Council. When Russia was promoting the cause of Russian sole ownership of the BSF, this was done awkwardly, since it did not fit with the more noble cause of defending the entire CIS. However, whereas the "joint" position often appeared as the "acceptable face" of a wish and an assumption that Russia would be the benefactor and dominant partner, developments soon raised the ceiling for Russian claims.

Among Russia's political institutions, the most uninhibited exponent for a Russian takeover of Crimea and the BSF was the parliament—the last Congress of People's Deputies, as well the first and second post-Soviet State Dumas. These assemblies were dominated by nationalist forces of different political leanings, which passed a series of resolutions whose potential to escalate tensions between Russia and Ukraine was moderated only by the MID and the president. These parliaments joined forces with military actors and Russian locals in Crimea and openly challenged the territorial and political integrity of Ukraine by encouraging separatism in Crimea.

Within a few days after the break-up of the USSR, the new *status quo* was challenged by the Russian Supreme Soviet. On 23 January, the Supreme Soviet voted overwhelmingly to instruct two of its committees to examine the legality of the 1954 transfer from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian union republic.¹³ Simultaneously, the issue began to be discussed in the press, with both nationalist and liberal publications

arguing about the legality of the transfer.¹⁴ In May 1992, in a closed session, the Supreme Soviet adopted a proposal to rescind the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. In its resolution on the “legal consideration,” the Supreme Soviet stated that the change of Crimea’s status constituted a violation of the constitution of the RSFSR, and that the legal procedures “did not have legal force from the moment it was passed.” While referring to the November 1990 agreement in which the Soviet republics agreed not to make territorial claims on each other, the assembly called for a “regulation of the issue” of Crimea’s status by means of inter-state negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, which would indicate the participation of Crimea.¹⁵

Whereas the position of accepting Ukrainian ownership of Crimea was expressed almost exclusively by liberals, not all of them accepted Crimea as being Ukrainian—or, at least, they were not prepared to be publicly associated with this view. It was Vladimir Lukin, the head of the Russian parliamentary committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations and later co-founder of the liberal party Yabloko, who in mid-January 1992 distributed to the Supreme Soviet a draft resolution declaring the 1954 decisions invalid.¹⁶ Rather than adapting this resolution right away, however, the Supreme Soviet voted for an examination of the legality of the 1954 transfer.¹⁷ The fact that the liberal deputies and parties did not seriously oppose the nationalist policies of the assemblies may be explained by the political leaning of the deputies, and by their concern not to be seen as completely insensitive to nationalist issues. These attitudes also help to explain the shift in the policies of Yeltsin regime towards other FSU (Former Soviet Union) states from 1993 onwards, bringing them more in line with the nationalist opposition. In particular, the president and the foreign minister gave the impression of having joined in the broad political consensus over the nationalist interests concerning the Russian diaspora in the FSU.

There is broad agreement among scholars that the increasingly nationalist character of statements made by Yeltsin and Kozyrev should be seen at least partly as an adjustment to what appeared to be the general political and public mood.¹⁸ This was the period when tension was escalating between the president and the opposition—Vice-President Rutskoy and the Supreme Soviet with its leader Ruslan Khasbulatov—and, later, when election to a new parliament was won by an extreme nationalist-populist, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that Yeltsin’s foreign policy was more inspired by accusations that he “lost the empire” than by actual considerations of ethnicity. Having said that, the relative moderation of the actual Russian foreign policy may be explained not only by the mindset of its main perpetrators, but also by the limitations on Russian capabilities. In addition, we must consider the potential cost of acting out a more radical policy: Yeltsin recognized that challenging Ukraine over Crimea might set in motion a full domino effect of territorial claims throughout the FSU. In any case, there certainly existed influential nationalist forces that were ready to exploit what they considered undue concessions to Ukraine. The strongest organization was the radical National Salvation Front (FNS), whose leadership included Ilya Konstantinov, Viktor Alksnis,

Gennadiy Zyuganov, Albert Makashov, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Sergey Baburin, Igor Shafarevich, and others.¹⁹ By December 1992, it was estimated that the FNS controlled a third of the seats in the Congress.²⁰ In its manifesto, the FNS spoke with contempt of the "sovereign republics." While stating that Russia should conduct its foreign policy with its own national interest in mind, the manifesto left little doubt that the new *status quo* was not really accepted.²¹ The aim of recreating the USSR was stated explicitly by FNS members such as Colonel Viktor Alksnis, who claimed that "The Front does not acknowledge the treacherous accord of the Belovezha putschists."²² On Crimea, the local branch of the FNS under the leadership of Aleksandr Kruglov played a highly visible role in the period considered in this article.²³

There were also a number of actors within the Kremlin and in the government who expressed opinions that diverged sharply from that of the president and the MID. Among the nationalist voices within Yeltsin's entourage, Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy, a former air force colonel, constituted the most ardent nationalist. Within six months of the June 1991 election, Rutskoy proved to be in serious disagreement with Yeltsin over a wide range of issues, and the October 1993 events in Moscow represented the culmination of this conflict. As mentioned earlier, however, the events of October 1993 did not signify the end of radical nationalism in Russia. On the contrary, the Duma election two months later brought Zhirinovskiy into high politics. According to reports, the military voted for his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in greater numbers than the population at large.²⁴ While disliked and distrusted by most other radical nationalists, Zhirinovskiy became one of the most prominent opposition politicians in the next two years, sticking to the expansionist and supremacist policies that made him famous. Zhirinovskiy could not use inter-ethnic animosity in relation to Ukraine in the same way he did with concern to the states in the Caucasus or the Baltic, but his clear pro-empire, ethnic-Russian-centered profile did have some appeal in Crimea's political climate.

As Ukrainian independence proved itself stable and the prospects for the Russian efforts to regain control over Crimea began to look increasingly bleak, the Russian nationalist forces were forced to adjust their short-term ambitions. While never explicitly giving up on Crimea, they began claiming Sevastopol as even more indisputably Russian territory. The claim, based on legal aspects of the 1954 transfer, was obviously related to the BSF. Furthermore, keeping Sevastopol as a base for the Russian BSF meant maintaining a strong military presence on Ukrainian territory, which in the future could serve both defensive and offensive purposes. In August 1992, the Congress of People's Deputies called upon the Supreme Soviet to examine the status of the city, referring to an RSFSR parliamentary decree from October 1948, which granted the city special administrative status.²⁵ Despite protests from Kiev, the Russian parliament in July 1993 affirmed in a nearly unanimously vote that Sevastopol was not legally part of the 1954 transfer. Consequently, it had been part of the USSR, and therefore indirectly of the Russian Federation, which constituted the successor state to the USSR. The Congress also instructed its constitutional

commission to initiate the legislative work necessary to change the city's status.²⁶ When in July 1993 the parliament declared Sevastopol a part of Russia, Yeltsin told reporters that he was "ashamed."²⁷

Two Concentric Circles of Group Identification

Even if we exclude the large and politically significant minorities in the Russian Federation from this discussion, there existed no agreement of how to draw the territorial borders of the new Russia. Russian nationalists and the Russian political leadership soon turned to defend their "compatriots" in the FSU. Indeed, the diaspora became the central aspect of the more assertive foreign policy that the Yeltsin regime embraced after 1993.²⁸ But if their emotional involvement was strong, so was their confusion. An estimate based on the 1989 census claimed that approximately 25 million ethnic Russians were left outside the Russian Federation. If this estimate were used as a guide for a reorganization of Russia's borders, it could lead to demands on parts of eastern Estonia, northern Kazakhstan, Transdniester, and southern and eastern Ukraine. Passport nationality did not constitute the only reason for motivating Russian pressures on its neighboring states. In order to square Russia's stated role as a multi-ethnic state (where all citizens were described as *rossiyane*) with the defense of ethnic Russians specifically, substantial creativity was put to use. One spoke of *sootechestvenniki* (compatriots), *ethnicheskie rossiyane*, and even *russko-dumaiushchee naselenie* (Russian-thinking population). The widest category counted all *russkoyazychnye*—Russian speakers. This category would include linguistically Russified Ukrainians, as well as former Soviet citizens who had made use of the employment opportunities in the USSR and adapted to the dominant culture.²⁹

In this complicated picture, the case of Crimea looked relatively simple. The peninsula has an ethnic Russian majority, and by 1989 ethnic Russians made up as much as 67% of the 2.43 million population, while Ukrainians accounted for only 26%. Moreover, the non-Russian population is heavily Russified. For instance, in 1989, 47% of Ukrainians stated Russian to be their mother tongue.³⁰ By early 1992, not a single Ukrainian-language school or newspaper existed in Crimea. At the same time, however, we are in the case of Crimea looking at two concentric circles of group identification of "Russianness." Russians in Russia may identify with the Russians in Crimea—defined by passport nationality (or by some less clear criteria). At the same time, however, *velikorossy* ("Great Russians") and *malorossy* ("Little Russians")—Ukrainians) are typically seen as brotherly peoples. Both these two wider interpretations of Russianness spring from a perception of cultural oneness.

Analysts have remarked upon the different phases in the policy of the Yeltsin regime towards the diaspora issue, and also to the scarce success of various other efforts, including the attempts to introduce dual citizenships with other CIS states (only Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have entered into such agreements).³¹ It was only

after the break-up of the USSR that the diaspora acquired full political significance in Russia, which brought out a majority of the self-acclaimed "patriots" as ethnic Russian nationalists. As barriers fell as to what could be said and by whom, efforts were being made to square the new accentuation on ethnicity with older patterns of thinking that had been inherited from the Soviet era. Only Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was able to free himself from this restriction; primarily by disregarding normal conventions, he was able to declare himself the spokesman of one ethnic group, the Russians. Zhirinovskiy claimed that, since the Russians were in majority, rebuilding the empire in their interest would provide a "democracy" of sorts. Defending this state would not amount to nationalism, but patriotism. In 1994, Zhirinovskiy explained that "Patriotism means keeping in mind the interests of the nation, which impersonates [ylitsetvoryat] a given state. To Russia that is the Russians [russkie], and Slavs in general."³²

The idea of an East Slav union had in fact been promoted well before the USSR disintegrated. Probably the single most influential advocate of such a union was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a considerably more sophisticated thinker than Zhirinovskiy. In late 1990, he published his pamphlet *Rebuilding Russia*. While advocating Russia giving up costly colonial projects, he expressed the hope that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians would elect to stay together in a *Rossiyskiy Soyuz*.³³ Like many other Russian politicians who favor a restoration of some sort of union with some of the former Soviet republics, Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov also envisages these ties as appearing first between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—the three East Slav republics and one with a large ethnic Russian minority. This is a policy that may have been fueled by pro-unification sentiments in some political circles in Ukraine and Belarus, but was above all justified by a perception of cultural proximity between the Slav peoples.

Coming to Terms with the Dissolution of the USSR

In post-Soviet Russia, being conservative most often means hankering for the old Soviet order, or at least for elements of it. During the Soviet years, "inter-ethnic relations in the USSR" was an important subject of university studies. But this was also an era during which the Slavs, and especially the ethnic Russians, were the elder brother in the family of peoples. Tolerance was preached in a context of oppression and ignorance. With few exceptions, the dominant nationalist actors in post-Soviet Russia are deeply influenced by this experience.

Whereas in the first year and a half after 1991, several liberal voices were heard from the armed forces—including those of officers like Vladimir Lopatin, Konstantin Kobets, Aleksandr Zhilin, and the independent officer's organization *Shchit* (Shield)—the important people remained traditionally conservative. This conservatism was especially prevalent among the senior officers who had served for many years in the Soviet Union when membership in the CPSU and communist indoctrina-

tion were practically compulsory. A slogan heard repeatedly from military leaders in these troubled years was "Armiya—vne politiki"—"The army is outside politics." Not everybody, however, subscribed to this notion. Several opinion polls indicated that a significant percentage of Russian officers believed that military men should be in charge of the country's military policy, if not of the entire country. Soviet patterns of thinking revealed themselves in the actions of military leaders in a number of hot spots in the FSU. While Russian policy in the field had numerous and oftentimes contradictory sources, local commanders clearly played a major role in places like Abkhazia, Transdniestra, and Crimea. The military's view of these conflicts was generally more in line with that of the Russian parliaments than of the president and government.³⁴ The military's instinctive conservatism revealed itself in the officers' reluctance to accept the creation of national armed forces. While the officers probably better than many others perceived the risks of such armies confronting each other, this reluctance nevertheless also indicated a lack of appreciation of the post-Soviet political reality.

The sentiments prevalent in the forces became visible to all in January 1992 as Russian television broadcast a stormy officers' assembly. Over 5,000 delegates from military units throughout the FSU gathered behind the Kremlin walls, trying to prevent a break-up of the Soviet armed forces.³⁵ Prior to the convention, conservative newspapers published numerous articles dramatizing the state of the armed forces. *Krasnaya Zvezda* published the findings of an opinion poll conducted among military servicemen, displaying that 80% of the respondents supported the idea that the CIS member states should have a common military doctrine and nuclear strategy. Seventy-seven percent wanted to see CIS general-purpose forces, and 76% wanted these to be subordinated to the CIS chief command.³⁶ On the day before the congress, Major-General Nikolay Stolyarov, the main organizer, stated his views in an article in *Izvestiya*, with the telling title "Integration Is as Valuable as Independence."³⁷ He claimed that "the question of a completely independent existence as a great blessing remains highly controversial." Only a joint Commonwealth army could be a guarantor of tranquillity, Stolyarov stated. An opinion poll conducted among the delegates at the officers' assembly confirmed that there was indeed widespread support for a single unified command. A mere 25% of the officers supported the idea of independent armies in the republics.³⁸ These ambitions were countered shortly afterwards by Major Vladimir Lopatin, a people's deputy and a representative of the young, liberal reformist wing of the armed forces. He had no illusions about the prospects of maintaining unified forces, and warned the assembly about politicizing the armed forces. "World history does not know of any examples where several states had a unitary force. The CIS is not a state," he said, warning that any attempt at securing the unity of the army was equal to an attempt to bring back the old system, and could unleash a "Yugoslav variant."³⁹

While it would still take several months before the idea of CIS forces had clearly proved itself irrelevant to the new *status quo*, developments were in fact already

pointing decisively in that direction. And, as this trend was unfolding, a different type of conservatism emerged that to a greater degree took into consideration the fact that the USSR no longer existed, and as such was more in line with the liberal democrats. At the same time, however, it went much further than the liberals did in terms of identifying Russia's interests as being in possible contradiction with those of other FSU states. And notably, Russian statehood was defined more clearly than ever before as associated with ethnic Russians.

Indicative is the process leading up to the adoption of a military doctrine for the Russian Federation. In March 1992—while insisting that Russia would still prefer to have unified CIS forces—Boris Yeltsin decreed the establishment of a Russian Ministry of Defense, with himself as the ministry's first chief. In May, he decreed the formation of Russian armed forces. That same month, the military leadership made public a new military doctrine.⁴⁰ This doctrine defined the violation of the rights and interests of Russian citizens and of people in former Soviet republics who "identify themselves, ethnically or culturally, with Russia as one possible source of military danger."⁴¹ In the military doctrine that was finally endorsed by President Yeltsin—only a few days after his showdown with the Supreme Soviet in October 1993, and widely seen as a payback for the support he received from the military—all references to ethnicity were gone. The relevant phrase now spoke of a source of danger or threat stemming from the suppression of the "rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states."⁴² As one analyst, Charles J. Dick, concluded, no country in the "near abroad" could take much comfort from the doctrine's assertions of non-interference and respect for the new states' sovereignty: the doctrine was "exceedingly moot as to whether Russia really has come to terms with their independence."⁴³ The process of formulating a military doctrine contained in itself inputs from the power games that were going on in Moscow, as well as between Russia and the other FSU states. In Russia, the diaspora became an important element of a foreign policy consensus that was developing where the MID had to adjust in relation to the opposition and the Ministry of Defence. With the former Soviet republics defining and acting out independent foreign policies that were frequently based on suspicions against Russia and an expressed intent of conducting an ethnified nation building within their borders, responses in Russia were often both incoherent and aggressive. Not least, the nationalist and assertive policies of independent Ukraine were a challenge to the Russian officers' capacity to adjust.

The Claims on Crimea: Legal and Cultural Arguments

As mentioned, the Soviet modes of thinking were primarily prominent among the older officers. In a strictly hierarchical organization, before disintegration had come as far as it has today, it was in the upper echelons that sentiments reflecting "Soviet patriotism" were most visible.⁴⁴ Certainly, the clean-ups in the military leadership after 1991, and Boris Yeltsin's promotion of a high number of officers to the level

of general, secured personnel in the MO and the General Staff that were reasonably reliable and not too out of line with the president's policies. But a significant number of high-ranking officers also stayed loyal to the parliaments. Among these were radical nationalists like Colonel Viktor Alksnis, Colonel-General Albert Makashov, Colonel-General Vladislav Achalov, Colonel Stanislav Terekhov, and former KGB General Aleksandr Sterligov, who were all members of the leadership of the National Salvation Front. It should also be noted that many of these officers were given extensive coverage in media controlled by the authorities, such as the MO's newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda*, and the government's own *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. The fury that Ukraine under the nationalist President Kravchuk provoked in these circles is illustrated by a 1993 opinion piece in *Rossiyskaya gazeta* by Vice-Admiral and Professor Kazimir Stalbo. In 1954, he wrote, the peninsula was "traded away," and with it one and a half million Russians [*russkikh*]. "This was a particular form of deportation of Russians, a method of apartheid, of which the great master of destruction of peoples Stalin had not thought." Pointing also to the simultaneous transfer of churches and Russian "holy places" [*svyatiny*], he concluded that world history had seen "no precedent" to such a crime. And he ended on a threatening note, reminding of the Black Sea Fleet's history of rebellions, going back to the tales of Ochakov (where the Russian navy inflicted a serious defeat on Turkish forces in 1788) and the *Potemkin*, and the defenses of Sevastopol: "The *chernomortsy*, as history has shown, are able to take their fate in their own hands. But why should things be taken to extremes?"⁴⁵

In the Supreme Soviet, the faction *Otchizna* (Native Land) was one rallying point of conservative military deputies. One member, Vice-Admiral Ravkat Chebotarevskiy, proved himself an exponent of a patriotism with an increasingly ethnic tint to it. Insisting that Sevastopol belonged to Russia, he pointed to legal arguments, as well as to the will of the local population. And again, the Russian Empire was equated with the Russian Federation and the ethnic Russians: "The fate of Sevastopol hurts every patriot of the Russian [*russkogo*] land ... It is impossible to undermine our people's belief that the blood of the protectors was not spilled in vain at the Black Sea strongholds."⁴⁶ In the Kremlin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy was no less confrontational. Rutskoy realized early that any reunification of the USSR was not realistic. As he lost his faith in the CIS, Rutskoy emerged as the regime's toughest man in a number of territorial disputes. On a much-covered mission to CIS hot spots in April 1992, the vice-president stated that the Black Sea Fleet "was Russian [*rossiyskiy*] and will remain Russian." Asked whether he had any information about military equipment being transferred from Crimea to Russia, he answered, "Why should we transfer anything from Russia to Russia?"⁴⁷ These senior officers, each in his own way, lived through a turbulent period in which they had to adjust their way of thinking. During the existence of the Soviet Union, they had never been forced to take a personal stand on the issue of what the RSFSR constituted in comparison to the USSR. Consequently, most of them would speak, as

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Rutskoy did, of the USSR as "Russia," and not really accept the break-up of the Union. As issues of ethnicity became more focused in the inter-state relations in the FSU, the majority of them began to increasingly emphasize their own Russianness as well as the Russian character of the Russian Federation. Given that a state like Ukraine, with a large Russian minority, was governed by a nationalizing leader like Kravchuk, it was difficult not to distinguish more clearly between the East Slav peoples.

Moreover, when turning to defend strictly Russian interests that were in contradiction with those of other FSU states, Soviet nostalgics may have done so recognizing that this was as good as things would get for the time being: Russia was the nearest one would come to the USSR, and—if not by virtue of Boris Yeltsin's leadership—would serve as a carrier of the imperial idea until their day would come.

While the officers quoted above did express attitudes that were widespread in the forces, they did belong to a category of officers more rigid in their convictions, and less subtle style-wise. Moreover, these were officers who placed issues of nationality higher on the political agenda than the average officer did. Contrary to what one might assume, Russian officers in this period did not to any great degree appear in the media, making outright nationalist or expansionist statements. Rather, the coverage of service in FSU hot spots focused much more on the hardships facing the men, on Russian policy, and national interests. In particular, the social protection of servicemen became a major issue.

If we consider the BSF leadership under Admiral Igor Kasatonov and later under Admiral Baltin, we see admirals who were nominally leaders of CIS forces but in real fact were clearly operating to maximize Russian interests. With regard to Kasatonov, it is telling that in December 1992 he returned to Moscow to serve as first Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian navy.⁴⁸ His successor, Admiral Eduard Baltin, was jointly nominated by Russia and Ukraine. As it turned out, Baltin displayed similar views to Kasatonov on many issues. Like his predecessor, Baltin actively resisted the politicians' division of the Fleet.⁴⁹

At the same time, however, the press coverage from this period suggests that if the BSF leadership on its part had been very concerned with ethnicity *per se*, this was not reflected in their public statements. Of course, one might reason that an uncompromising Russian stance on the BSF and Sevastopol would automatically take care of concerns one might have on behalf of the Russian population. Still, while securing a military presence on Crimea, this would not necessarily satisfy the wishes of the population as a whole. Thus, such reasoning does not seem to properly explain the limited attention the military paid to the diaspora.

Even the gruff-spoken commander Admiral Kasatonov did not put much emphasis on ethnicity. In 1993, after he had returned to Russia from Crimea, Kasatonov on several occasions alleged that Ukraine was implementing "a carefully worked-out plan" to take over the Fleet.⁵⁰ In fact, he would go as far as to claim that Ukraine was preparing for an armed takeover of the Fleet: "And this plan is aimed against the

people with whom Ukrainians have been brothers and were on friendly terms with for centuries.⁵¹ This was as far the admiral would go in referring to cultural traits.

If we turn to consider the officer staff of the BSF as a whole, the impression is that they were less firm in their convictions than the top leadership. The command of the Fleet was overwhelmingly ethnic Russian, as were the personnel at large: by January 1992, fewer than 30% of the Black Sea fleet's 70,000 sailors were Ukrainian.⁵² At the same time, however, it seems that nationality did not play the acute role among these as it did among the more nationalistically inclined senior officers.

At this point, it may be useful to introduce a distinction between the *character* and the *intensity* of an individual's sense of national belonging. Basically, we may hypothesize that officers at large may have been conservative, and—if having to choose—would easily prefer to identify with Russia rather than any other former Soviet republic. At the same time, this sense of belonging may not have been so important in the mind of the individual that he would not compromise it if he was convinced that doing so would make his life easier in a material or some other sense. In other words, the character of a given identity may by itself have been in line with, say, a bellicose Russian foreign policy, but other, more pressing personal concerns were keeping the individual under the threshold at which he would act on the former. Military men did certainly relate to such issues in their own minds. One opinion poll, conducted in March 1994, put officers (not only in the BSF) on top as the category of respondents (out of 11) that was most in favor of Russia pursuing a firm policy in relation to states that were encroaching on the rights of Russian-speakers—61% of the officers supported such a position. In comparison, this position only enjoyed the support of 40% of the population as a whole.⁵³ At the same time, however, the officers also comprised the category with the highest preference for withdrawing Russian forces from the countries of the FSU—41% supported this position, whereas the population as a whole scored 28%. Officers scored exactly the same (4%) as the general population on the question of whether Russian forces should be used to solve ethnic conflicts in the former union republics. Some very interesting findings appear when we compare polls that were repeated over time. One such poll has been conducted by the Public Opinion Fund (FOM). If one compares polls FOM did in the fall of 1992, spring of 1993, fall of 1993, and spring of 1994, the polls display that the military's support for the establishment of a centralized state on the territory of the FSU steadily decreased. By fall of 1992, 19% supported this idea. By spring of 1994, the figure was 15%. Among the population as a whole, the figures were 19% and 21%, respectively.⁵⁴ The military also reduced its support for a strengthening of the economic and political ties between CIS states—from 43% in the fall of 1992 to 36% in the spring of 1994. For the population as a whole, the figure fell from 39% to 30%.⁵⁵

What we have here is an army in which the costs of re-establishing the USSR to an increasing degree is considered prohibitively high, and/or the interest in seeing that happen simply is not as great. In any case, the officers are by the force of the

status quo adopting to the new borders of the Russian state. However, the military is still strongly concerned about the interests of Russian speakers—and they are more in favor of disconnecting from the other republics than is the population as a whole. Both of these attitudes may be explained by the specific experiences of the military themselves; they knew many stories of harassment of their own personnel. Whereas they would like someone to stand up for the diaspora, they realized how unsuccessful Russian military missions had been on several occasions. Most likely, they would themselves be the ones to bear the cost of such a more interventionist policy. Under such circumstances, disconnection made the most sense.

The Considerations of the BSF Officers

It would seem logical to explain the BSF servicemen's identification with Russia, rather than with Ukraine, with the fact that a majority of servicemen were ethnic Russians. Admittedly, a good half of Crimeans actually voted in favor of Ukrainian independence in December 1991. And, perhaps even more surprisingly, 72% of Black Sea Fleet personnel reportedly supported independence.⁵⁶ However, it was clear even at that time that this positive attitude towards Ukrainian independence was precarious, since it was primarily based on high expectations of Ukrainian economic performance. In addition, the Ukrainian claim to sole control over the Fleet had not yet been made. Within the next six months, sympathy for Ukraine fell sharply within the BSF. By mid-1994, disillusionment with Ukraine's economic performance—during 1993, Ukraine reportedly ceased almost completely to contribute to the upkeep of the BSF⁵⁷—its policy of Ukrainianization, and its sharp position on the issue of the Fleet had all contributed to give way to a more deep-seated sense of identification with Russia. In June, 89% of Crimeans, including the BSF servicemen, voted in support of Sevastopol being a Russian city and for maintaining it as the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Two months later, spurred by the "absence of concrete decisions on the town's status and on the Black Sea Fleet," a great majority of the Sevastopol City Council deputies, to whom the concerns and interests of the local servicemen counted heavily, voted to recognize the Russian legal status of Sevastopol.⁵⁸ The Ukrainian presidential administration, and the Crimean President Meshkov both condemned the resolution, while the Russian government issued a statement saying that it did not recognize Sevastopol's Russian status.⁵⁹ On several other occasions, local officers and Sevastopol politicians stood up for solutions that troubled not only the Ukrainians, but also the Russian leadership.

Media reports at the time reflected the impression that the military in these troubled times were concerned mostly about securing good living conditions for themselves and their families, rather than standing up for less tangible ideas of identity. In January 1992, reporting from Crimea, a *Moscow News* journalist concluded, "Regrettably, there are few patriots of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol." Ukraine had promised to keep the officers and their families with salary

and bread, and that made the difference: “Unit commanders still come under the influence of their superiors, but mid-level officers are more influenced by their wives.”⁶⁰ When *Krasnaya zvezda* reported a few weeks later from the Kharkov Rocket School, the assessment was the same: 90% of the officers there had recently sworn an oath to Ukraine. Colonel A. Popov, a senior combat training officer, explained their choice by “mundane problems, pure and simple, and a lack of confidence in the future … rather than political or ethnic convictions.”⁶¹

Calculating economic benefits against identity was clearly a difficult experience for many BSF officers, and the problems that resulted were the subject of substantial news coverage. In early 1992, *Izvestiya* printed a letter to the editor from a Major Astakhov, an ethnic Russian officer who had taken an oath to serve Ukraine. Did this mean, asked the newspaper’s commentator, that Astakhov had “sold the honor of a Russian officer for Ukrainian *vareniki* and nourishing *borshch* with lard?” Comforting the major, the journalist pointed out that it was not after all Japan he has chosen to serve, but “the native [*rodnoy*] people, always close to us, among whom, moreover, are twelve million Russians [*russkie*].” Facing the critics head on, the journalist quoted another letter, from a retired major who had spoken of the duty to serve one’s people to the final breath: “A few months ago everything was simple: one’s people were all the peoples of the USSR, irrespective of nationality. But now, under new conditions, how does one decipher this term ‘one’s people’? Exclusively by the ‘nationality’ point [in the internal passport]? And is really affiliation by this graph an impediment for serving another truthfully?”⁶²

All in all, more than half of the officers who found themselves in Ukraine at the beginning of 1992 were ethnic Russian. A great majority of these in the end took an oath to serve Ukraine. The reasons why officers from outside of Ukraine chose do so were probably related to issues other than identity or emotional loyalty. President Kravchuk had promised the officers better housing and better pay. Furthermore, as Peter J. S. Duncan has pointed out, joining Ukraine would relieve them of the risk of having to take part in the Caucasian wars that Russia was being drawn into.⁶³ Even the milder climate played a role; serving in sunny Crimea was considerably more pleasant than serving in, say, Severomorsk or Vladivostok.

In the Black Sea Fleet, however, the picture was quite different. Not only the commanders but also most officers refused to go to the Ukrainian side. By mid-1993, it was reported that only 2% of the officers had opted to transfer to the Ukrainian navy, while the majority refused to subordinate themselves to the presidents’ decision to split the Fleet.⁶⁴ If we turn to opinion polls again, some data also exist for the sentiments in the officer corps of the BSF. One poll, conducted one year after independence, revealed that sympathies were strongly in support of Russia, or for some sort of unified entity. Some 80% of the officers would like to see an allied Russian–Ukrainian fleet (at this stage, the BSF found itself in a problematic state of joint Russian–Ukrainian command, due to be divided in 1995, in line with the August 1992 Yalta agreement.) The pro-Russian dominance became clear as 67%

would prefer to serve Russia after a division of the fleet, while only 5% would serve Ukraine. Only 7% maintained that Sevastopol should belong to Ukraine, whereas 45% thought it should belong to Russia. As many as 43% were in favor of the restoration of a single state.⁶⁵

Fully comparable figures are not available, but a March 1994 poll showed that 31% of Russian officers supported the re-establishment of a unitary state within the borders of the FSU. The officers scored slightly lower than the average of the population, with 31% versus 33%. A different poll among Russian officers, conducted in the fall of 1992, spring of 1993, fall of 1993, and spring of 1994, shows that the military's support for the establishment of a centralized state on the territory of the FSU was declining. By the fall of 1992, 19% supported this idea. By the spring of 1994, the figure was 15%. For the population as a whole, the figures were 19% and 21%, respectively.⁶⁶

These statistics indicate that support for a restoration of a Slavic union or the USSR was higher among officers in Crimea at the time than it was among Russian officers at large. This can be explained in several ways. On the one hand, it could demonstrate a continued belief in Slavic oneness. On the other, however, it also reveals a concern that tensions between the two countries must not escalate. The severity of the inter-state conflict here made the necessity of easing tensions more acute here than, say, among the servicemen of the Northern Fleet.

The BSF and Sevastopol: Acting on New National Interests

According to Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the Joint Armed Forces (JAF) Commander in Chief,⁶⁷ President Yeltsin was "inclined" to support unitary forces at the time of the December 1991 Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement. Shaposhnikov later blamed the legislatures of "some states," and in particular Ukraine, for initiating the division of the Soviet forces.⁶⁸ Even as President Yeltsin established national Russian armed forces in May, the strategic forces formally remained under the Commonwealth Commander in Chief. As for the Black Sea Fleet, the prevailing opinion on the Russian side was one in favor of joint CIS control. The Russians would refer to the December 1991 Minsk agreement, which declared that the Soviet fleets should be considered part of the strategic forces, and therefore belonged under CIS joint command.

While perhaps not as sincerely as the presidential adviser, several military leaders at one point reasoned in similar patterns to Galina Starovoitova. For instance, the first deputy commander of the CIS Naval Forces, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, argued that if Ukraine deserved part of the BSF, then so did Moldova and Georgia.⁶⁹ Marshal Shaposhnikov said that it was wrong of Ukraine to claim more of the BSF than other republics did: "Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan could also lay claims to this particular share of the Fleet."⁷⁰

As Russia moved towards creating its own armed forces, its policies shifted rapidly from focusing on the interests of the CIS to those of Russia itself. In late May, Shaposhnikov facilitated this policy by declaring that the BSF was, after all, *not* part of the strategic forces.⁷¹ Thus, the tug of war over the Fleet was now between Russia and Ukraine. In the ensuing negotiations, they were the parties to the dispute.⁷² Arguments were about which of the two should receive more vessels, whose bases would be located where, and what sort of command would be established. The ambivalence Yeltsin displayed by insisting on joint CIS command, and at the same time declaring that the Fleet was Russian simply reflected the reality of Russian ascendancy within the Commonwealth, as Mark Webber has pointed out.⁷³ At the same time, as Dmitriy Trenin remarked, this strong-man approach, in line with the tradition from Belovezhskaya Pushcha, served to gravely impair Russia's prestige as a reliable international partner.⁷⁴

Shaposhnikov, who was generally considered a moderate military leader, was at loggerheads with Ukrainian President Kravchuk as early as December 1991. Shaposhnikov envisaged the newly independent republics with only modest, lightly armed units. Strategic defense would be taken care of by the CIS forces, which, one might add, like the Soviet forces, were dominated by Russian officers. By early January 1992, Kravchuk described the policies of Shaposhnikov as "backward," and said that they were provoking confrontation between Commonwealth members.⁷⁵ Shaposhnikov in early 1992 made it clear that he was not fond of Ukraine's aiming for maximum sovereignty: "I understand and accept the right of each state to create its own armed forces, but it is not necessary to do so in an outright barbarian way," Shaposhnikov said, adding that he considered that the BSF was "the property of the CIS, and not any one single state."⁷⁶ As he explained in a 1993 interview, Shaposhnikov even before the August coup had understood that the Union had one foot in the grave; "although it hurts me to say so."⁷⁷ He first heard about the Commonwealth when the Slavic accord was agreed upon. "I supported it for there to be something," he said, adding that in time he believed a new quality of cooperation would appear "between our brotherly peoples." Regretting the downfall of the Soviet Union, Shaposhnikov said he was "categorically against any oaths—Ukrainian, Belorussian, Russian, Uzbek, and so on—for those who have already taken an oath."⁷⁸

As Boris Yeltsin headed for a showdown over President Kravchuk's claim on the BSF by insisting that the Fleet "was, is, and will remain Russia's," Marshal Shaposhnikov sent telegrams to military districts and fleets ordering the officers that their troops should swear allegiance to the CIS—emphasizing that the oath enclosed with the telegrams had been approved by Boris Yeltsin.⁷⁹ While Kravchuk's action was reckless, and the JAF commander's response to it could only be negative, Shaposhnikov could not help but represent Russia specifically in the dispute. As we have already seen, Shaposhnikov allowed for the BSF to become a bilateral issue, despite earlier insistence that it was the property of all the republics. For his home audience, as *e.g.*, the Supreme Soviet, Shaposhnikov pointed out that while being the

JAF Commander in Chief, he was "first and foremost a citizen of Russia ... representing its citizens in military uniform."⁸⁰ Normally, however, he would insist that his being a Russian citizen did not imply that he was representing only Russian interests, and that Russia wanted to see itself above all as the most important element of the Commonwealth.⁸¹

The behavior of the BSF commander, Admiral Kasatonov, also unequivocally benefited the Russian Federation during this tense period. Kasatonov repeatedly refused to take orders from Ukraine. While President Kravchuk could hardly have expected a former Soviet commander to obey when ordered to hand over vessels to Ukraine, or administer the oath taking for that state, Kasatonov's removal soon became a public demand from the Ukrainian leadership. The Fleet, Kasatonov insisted, was integral to the Commonwealth navy and "dismembering it would be like dismembering living flesh."⁸² He felt only contempt for the Ukrainian side in the dispute: by his own account, he and two military district leaders were summoned to Kravchuk, who informed them that he was now the commander of Ukraine's armed forces, and that they, the personnel, hardware, and weapons were transferred to his command. Kasatonov complained: "I said: I have already taken a military oath of allegiance to Ukraine, and also to Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and the other republics of the Union." Some people in Ukraine looked upon the Black Sea Fleet as a commodity, Kasatonov argued: "Just about everybody in Ukraine seems to be discussing the future of the Fleet: agronomists, journalists, housewives."⁸³

It may not seem difficult to find reasons why Russia and its military leaders wished to control Sevastopol and the BSF. Nevertheless, arguments in this dispute should not be taken only at face value, especially since the Fleet itself was in a rather sorry state. Among the arguments most often put forward were those using the biological analogy that Kasatonov had employed earlier; insisting that ships made up limbs of a vulnerable organism. Even more frequent claims were related to history. Sevastopol was the *gorod-geroy* (hero city) of two major wars. Russian nationalists would refer to the dispute over Sevastopol as the "Third Defense"⁸⁴—the "First Defense" being the 1853–1856 Crimean War; the "Second Defense" took place in World War II, when Crimea was attacked by German Nazi forces. A deep-seated sense of national pride was tied to these historical events. And the Russian nationalists placed the post-Soviet conflict over Crimea and the BSF in this context. Pål Kolstø, writing on nation building in the FSU, has placed particular emphasis on this and other dimensions of national prestige in explaining the high level of conflict over Crimea and the poorly maintained Fleet.⁸⁵

Many pro-Russian statements about both Crimea and the BSF argued that there are "no signs in history" of a Ukrainian Fleet, or of Crimea belonging to any other state than Russia. Admiral V. Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the former Soviet navy stated, "The idea that Ukraine is a great sea power is already being declared. Excuse me, but when was it a great sea power ... it has never had its own navy—this we know from history."⁸⁶ Arguments along these lines were probably most common

when the Russian side justified its claim on the BSF. More generally, a typical Russian nationalist impulse in the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet has been to equate the Russian Federation with the Russian Empire. Thus, since Crimea was annexed, and the Fleet was founded by Catherine the Great, they both obviously are Russian properties. The logical fallacy is rarely identified: the very transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 marked the 300th anniversary of *hetman* Bohdan Khmelnitskiy's alliance with the tsar. Ukraine, then, has a long history as part of *Rossiya*. This equation has also been made by several military actors. For instance, Admiral Kapitanets, in an early 1992 interview left no doubt that his interests were those of the CIS only to the extent that they coincided with those of the Russian Federation. Initially, he stated the Russian position that defined "strategic forces" more widely than did the Ukrainian one, thereby including the BSF. Thereafter, however, he openly identified the old empire—and the CIS—with the Russian Federation: "If we are to look at this from a historical point of view, the Black Sea Fleet was founded in 1783 after the liberation of Crimea by Russian forces," he said, failing to point out that what is today Ukraine was indeed part of the empire well before that event. He deplored the Ukrainian invitations to seamen to swear their allegiance to Ukraine: "But what about the traditions of the Russian [*russkogo*] fleet, the military honor! ... We have a homeland—Russia, she created the fleet. Why should we give it away to anybody, even for a sweeter cottage loaf?!"⁸⁷

One of the lone voices that pointed to the weakness of such arguments was that of a historian—born and raised in Crimea—in the liberal magazine *Novoe Vremya*. Making the point that an empire's history tends to provide basis for more than one people to claim ownership of any territory, he concluded that Sevastopol "is the city of glory of the Russian Empire [*slavy rossiyskoy imperii*], and not just of Russian glory [*russkoy slavy*]. Is it a shame for a Russian [*russkiy*] today to go to a foreign Crimea? It is. ... But are not the Poles ashamed over Lvov? And the Finns over Karelia? And the Germans over East Prussia?"⁸⁸

In reality, the fact that the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine could be challenged not only by direct claims on Sevastopol or the entire peninsula, but also by the claims on the Black Sea Fleet must have been most important in Russian calculations. Which was the more important to Russia—the Crimea or the Black Sea Fleet? Natalia Belitser and Oleg Bodruk have concluded that the peninsula ranked at the top of Russian priorities, basically because "Crimea may exist without the fleet, the fleet without the Crimea is doomed."⁸⁹ Similarly, Vasily Kremen has concluded that the issue of the BSF was not one of security, but of politics. To keep bases in Crimea will enable Russia to exert a certain influence on this part of Ukraine, and also relax the nostalgic feelings on the part of some Russian citizens and politicians.⁹⁰ In July 1993, the newspaper *Kommersant* concluded that both Crimea and Sevastopol were, *de jure*, part of Ukraine. Furthermore, since the principle "what's on our territory belongs to us" had been almost generally implemented in the division of Soviet

military hardware, Moscow politicians had maintained that making claims on the Fleet would be the most efficient way to make a claim on Crimea itself.⁹¹ Similarly, an independent voice in the newspaper *Izvestiya* that same year pointed to the necessity to understand that "the battle is not only about the fleet, but about Crimea. In this battle Russia operates precisely on its military presence on Crimea."⁹²

Perhaps more important than the exact motivations on the Russian side is the outcome of the conflict in the early 1990s. It may not even be that the Russians themselves had ranked the objects by importance; they may well have been viewed and dealt with as inseparable. As for the outcome, it was more or less clear before the end of 1992 that a settlement between Russia and Ukraine one way or the other would give the former the lion's share of the Fleet and the right to remain anchored in Sevastopol for the time being. Thus, the Ukrainian authorities in fact, though extremely reluctantly, permitted Russia a continued military presence in Crimea and on Ukrainian territory. That, in turn, means that Russian political actors who still dispute Ukraine's ownership of Crimea have a presence on the peninsula from which to challenge the leadership in Kiev. Despite agreements with Ukraine, few opposition politicians in Russia have explicitly abandoned their claims on Crimea. One poll, conducted among State Duma deputies in mid-1994, reportedly showed that only 3.4% of the deputies thought Crimea should belong to Ukraine.⁹³ In October 1996, the State Duma voted 282 to 0 in favor of a resolution calling on its Ukrainian counterpart to reverse its "unilateral approach" to the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the status of Sevastopol and the "arbitrary" 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.⁹⁴ One prominent exponent of an aggressive Russian line on this issue is Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. Among his more extravagant initiatives are his construction of housing quarters for Russian BSF personnel in Sevastopol, and a January 1995 declaration that the city constituted Moscow's eleventh district.

Among military officers, such sentiments are also evident. However, while they dispute the legitimacy of the post-Soviet borders, the officers also still indicate a strong sense of affinity to the Ukrainians. In a mid-1995 survey of 600 field-grade officers (majors through colonels) throughout Russia, only 5% agreed "very much" with the proposition that the current borders of the Russian Federation were "completely just" (32.2% agreed "somewhat"). As many as 81.2% agreed "very much" or "somewhat" that Russia should reunite with Ukraine.⁹⁵

Conclusion

Conservatism was a characteristic trait of several of the actors examined, and above all of the political opposition and the armed forces. This conservatism looked back to the Soviet order; if not necessarily to the theoretical essence of Communism, then at least to the international status of the USSR, and to the inter-ethnic and inter-republic relations within that state. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, identities shaped in this context were strongly challenged. In this article, I have

suggested that there existed a lag in Russian national identity after the break-up of the USSR. Through the discussion, I have identified mechanisms that I consider to have been important in the process of bringing Russians', and more specifically Russian officers', image of "Russia" more into line with the new *status quo*.

Whereas the fact of all the other Soviet republics acquiring independent status seemed unnatural to Russian nationalists—they never tired of writing "newly independent states" in quotation marks—the case of Ukraine arguably caused particular distress. That being so, it also made a particularly strong contribution in instigating the reshaping of Russian national identity. The character of this contribution may be summarized as follows.

When the RSFSR and the Ukrainian Soviet republic became independent states, and a reintegration of the USSR became less and less likely to occur, it became increasingly difficult to habitually consider the USSR as one's homeland. Each citizen had to relate to the authorities of, say, the Russian Federation, which had played a much less significant role earlier. Thereby, the impetus of the new *status quo* by itself instigated the formation of a new, narrower civic identity. This impetus was reinforced, in the case of Russian–Ukrainian relations, by the fact that the two states were led by politicians who did not necessarily see the new states' interests as compatible (and the parliaments stood on the side calling for even more radical solutions). As confrontation grew sharper, identification among citizens with the "national interests" of each state grew stronger. Thus, one major trend in post-Soviet Russia was the decreased identification with the former Soviet Union. As Vera Tolz has pointed out, during 1993–1994 Russian nationalists seemed to give up on Soviet reunion, and instead intensified their efforts for a Slavic union.⁹⁶ However, whereas a Slavic reunion did become more plausible than a Soviet one, I propose that the sense of oneness with other Slavs (*i.e.*, in this case, with the Ukrainians) on the whole also decreased in this period. Hopes for a Slavic union were based more on old conceptions of cultural proximity rather than on the actual political climate at the time.

While this was the dominant trend, we may also assume that some Soviet nostalgics, *e.g.*, on an issue such as ownership of Black Sea Fleet, supported Russia recognizing that this was as good as things would get for the time being: the Russian Federation was the nearest one would come to the USSR, and—if not by virtue of Boris Yeltsin's leadership—might serve as a carrier of the imperial idea until their day would come.

Parallel to the trend towards identification with the Russian Federation was another major trend manifesting itself where the majority population in Russia increasingly identified that state with Russian ethnicity. As was pointed out in the introduction, the very fact that the population of the Federation was now more homogeneous than that of the USSR served to facilitate such a trend. However, an equally important factor to this effect were the numerous instances of confrontation between the former Soviet republics, in particular over issues related to the diaspora.

"YOU TAKE YOUR OATH ONLY ONCE"

In relations with Ukraine, the dispute over Crimea furthermore increased the significance of the distinction between the two East Slav peoples, given that ethnic Russians were now left to live in a nationalizing Ukrainian state.

I have presented details from opinion polls and press reports that suggest that military servicemen, while they may have nurtured rigid nationalist sentiments, in reality came across as rather flexible on issues of nationality. A majority among BSF servicemen at an early stage sided with Ukrainian independence, most probably on basis of their personal calculations of economic benefit. As they became disappointed by Ukraine's performance, the men, a majority of whom were ethnic Russians, sided decisively with Russia. In order to explain this development better, I introduced a distinction between the *character* and the *intensity* of an individual's sense of national belonging. Making a final equation about what counted much in this case—national identity or personal economic benefits—is virtually impossible. Still, I would propose that the heritage of "Soviet patriotism" with its heavy Russian coloration made thorough identification with any other state rare among individuals of Russian nationality—even if the Russian Federation was neither the Russian Empire nor the Soviet Union.

NOTES

- * The author would like to thank Pavel Baev, Tor Bukkvoll, Pål Kolstø, Gwen Sasse and the anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this article.
- 1. Russian ethnicity is as a rule here used to describe those with *russkiy* listed in their "point five" in official documents; the so-called "passport nationality." For a detailed discussion of the issue of nationality in the Soviet Union and Russia, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Inheriting the Soviet Policy Toolbox. Russia's Dilemma Over Ascriptive Nationality," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 6, 1999, pp. 1069–1087.
- 2. Roman Szporluk, "Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space," in R. Szporluk, ed., *Nation, Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 9.
- 3. Nationalism I will define here as a doctrine emphasizing the importance of the individual's belonging to a ethnic group, and of the promotion of the interests of this group—which is perceived by the "nationalist" to form a "nation." Such promotion may above all imply efforts to make the borders of a state coincide with those of a ethnic group, but may also take other expressions. The character of the nationalism may vary depending on, *inter alia*, its perception of other ethnic groups, and its territorial aspirations. When I refer to a "nation," I will do so in the understanding of the individual perception that I am dealing with at the moment, while not necessarily endorsing this assessment. This interpretation is not meant as the last word on the degree of "constructedness" of nations, or in this case, the "Russian nation;" rather, it is as deep into this discussion I consider it necessary to go in this specific context.
- 4. In reality, the city did not become directly subordinated to the RSFSR, but rather to the Union itself; the proper term for its status was *gorod soyuznogo podчинения*.
- 5. The Fleet counted 21 submarines, 35 principal surface combatants and some 240 other surface ships; as well as other forces, including naval aviation (some 244 combat aircraft and

85 combat helicopters), naval infantry and coastal defense forces. Figures from *The Military Balance 1993–1994* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 103.

6. Among the classic works in this field, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (London: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957 [1985]), p. 79; and Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times. On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 2.
7. The cut-off date has been defined by two events: Leonid Kuchma replaced Leonid Kravchuk as president of Ukraine, elected on a platform promising closer ties with Russia (July 1994); and Russian federal forces invaded Chechnya (December 1994), concentrating Moscow's attention on the North Caucasus, and making it important for the Yeltsin regime not to appear as an instigator of separatism in general.
8. For a more detailed chronology up to this event, see Ustina Markus, "Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 13, 1995, pp 30–34. The current state of Crimea and the BSF in Russian–Ukrainian relations was defined in May 1997. On 28 May, the prime ministers of the two countries signed three agreements related to the BSF issue: on the division of the fleet, on Russia's rights to bases in Crimea, and on debt settlement. The parties agreed that Russia's fleet would remain based in Sevastopol, leasing facilities there for 20 years. Then, on 31 May, Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, declaring respect for the respective countries' territorial integrity. Both countries' federal assemblies have since ratified these agreements. For a brief outline of the agreements, see Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia: Conflicts and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp 118–120. A thorough analysis is provided in James Sherr, "Russia–Ukraine *Rapprochement?* The Black Sea Fleet Accords," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1997, pp. 33–50.
9. This author's survey on the media coverage from this period indicate that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev only to a very modest degree participated in the debates over Crimea and the BSF. As for Grachev, this contrasts strongly with his activities in relation to the Baltic states.
10. Vera Tolz, "Conflicting 'Homelands Myths' and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1998, p. 283. Starovoitova and Tishkov both had left the Yeltsin team by the end of 1992.
11. Mark Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety. Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia* (New York: Longman, 1995), p. 153.
12. "Galina Starovoitova: Mistakes Are Costly," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 22 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-016.
13. Roman Solchanyk: "Ukrainian–Russian Confrontation over the Crimea," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 10 February 1992, IR920096.RIR, p. 26.
14. See, e.g., "Krym v fevrale 1954 goda," *Moskovskie novosti*, 2 February 1992. This article also features the brief decree from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the transfer.
15. "Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiyskoy Federatsii. O pravovoy otsenke resheniy vysshikh organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti RSFSR po izmenniyu statusa Kryma, prinyatykh v 1954 gody." Reprinted in *Chernomorskoy Flot, gorod Sevastopol i nekotorye problemy rossiysko-ukrainskikh otnosheniy. Khronika, dokumenty, analiz, mneniya (1991–1997 gg.)* (Moscow: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1997), p. 25.
16. Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 9 October 1992, p. 6.
17. Roman Solchanyk: "Ukrainian–Russian Confrontation over the Crimea," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 10 February 1992, p. 26.

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18. For an examination of the role of key institutions in the formation of Russian foreign and security policy, see Stephen F. Larrabee and Theodore W. Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking under Yeltsin* (Santa Monica: National Defense Research Institute/RAND, 1997).
19. *Nasha Rossiya—Vestnik FNS*, No. 21 (45), 1992.
20. Estimate made by Associated Press, quoted in *Dagens Næringsliv*, 3 December 1992.
21. *Manifest Fronta Natsionalnogo Spaseniya* (1992).
22. Viktor Alksnis, *Vystoim i pobedim* (Moscow: SSSR (sic)), 1993, p. 9.
23. Under Kruglov, the FNS has been described as displaying "little caution in dealing with sensitive ethnic and geopolitical issues and [Kruglov's] statements have been highly incendiary," Jane I. Dawson, "Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1997, p. 433.
24. For an analysis of the military's vote, see James Sherr, "Russia's Elections—the Military Implications," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, pp. 67–68.
25. *RFE/RL Daily Brief*, 12 August 1992.
26. *RFERL Daily Brief*, 12 July 1993.
27. *Ibid.*
28. For a convincing analysis of phases in the regime's foreign policy, see Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, "Introduction," in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For a parallel analysis of policy phases related to the diaspora issue, see Neil J. Melvin, "The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire," in Charles King, and Neil J. Melvin, eds, *Nations Abroad. Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).
29. A detailed discussion of the different definitions of Russianness that were employed is provided in Neil Melvin, *Forging the New Russian Nation. Russian Foreign Policy and the Russian-Speaking Communities of the Former USSR* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russian and CIS Programme Discussion Paper 50, 1994), pp. 17–22. These terms are also discussed in S. G. Simonsen, "Raising 'the Russian Question': Ethnicity and Statehood—*Russkie* and *Rossiya*," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, pp. 91–110.
30. As for other groups, the number of Crimean Tatars was 38, 000; of Belarusians 50, 000. Figures from *Natsionalnyy sostav naseleniya SSSR* (Moscow: Goskomstat SSSR, Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 82. Within a few years, the return of Tatars brought the number much higher; by 1992, it was estimated at 210, 000. Ian Bremmer, "Ethnic Issues in Crimea," *RFE/RL Research Report*. Vol. 2, No. 18, 1993, p. 25.
31. The treaty involving Tajikistan has not been ratified by Russia. For an in-depth discussion of the issue of dual citizenship, see Igor Zevelev, "Russia and the Russian Diasporas," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1996, pp. 266–272.
32. "My vsegda otkryty dlya vsekh," *Oppozitsiya*, No.4, 1994.
33. For a discussion of this work, see John B. Dunlop, "Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds, *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 58–60.
34. The best study of Russian military policy in the "near abroad" and the Russian military in general is Pavel Baev, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles* (London: Sage/PRIO, 1996).
35. See "Ofitserskoe sobranie nastaivaet na edinstvye vooruzhennykh sil," *Izvestiya*, 18 January 1992; and "Manevry vokrug ochen vooruzhennykh sil," *Izvestiya*, 20 January 1992.
36. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, as reported by *Russian Press Digest*, 14 February 1992
37. Nikolay Stolyarov, "Integratsiya tak zhe tsenna, kak i nezavisimost," *Izvestiya*, 16 January

1992. Stolyarov was an aide to the Commander in Chief of the CIS forces, and chairman of the personnel committee.

38. "Soviet Officers Start Political Movement; Aim Is to Preserve Military Unity, Benefits," *Washington Post*, 17 January 1992.
39. Vladimir Lopatin, "Zashchitit li krasnaya armiya belyy dom," *Izvestiya*, 13 February 1992.
40. The doctrine was published in a special issue of *Voennaya Mysl* in May 1992.
41. Charles J. Dick, "Initial Thoughts on Russia's Draft Military Doctrine," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1992, p. 553. See also James M Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1993.
42. Dick, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994. Dick speculated that differences between the 1992 draft and this doctrine could be explained by the fact that the General Staff had a heavy influence on the earlier one, whereas the latter was mainly the work of the MO.
43. Dick, *ibid.*
44. For a thorough examination of the relationship between Slavs and non-Slavs within the Soviet armed forces, see Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society. A Sociology of the Soviet Military* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985), pp 180-209.
45. Vice-Admiral Kazimir Stalbo, "Prestuplenie veka; obekt i podelniki," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 24 June 1993. Another example of *Rossiyskaya gazeta* publishing articles at odds with government policy over Crimea is the Academy of Sciences member Georgiy Shakhazarov's flaming article "Mne stydno za Prezidenta" ("I Am Ashamed of the President"), published on 29 June 1993, as a response to Yeltsin's criticism of the Supreme Soviet.
46. "Sevastopol—gorod rossiyskiy," *Pravda*, 22 June 1993.
47. "Dlya chego perevozit chto-to iz Rossii v Rossiyu?" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 April 1992.
48. *Itar-Tass*, 5 October 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-194.
49. For a profile of Baltin, see Scott Parrish, "Admiral Eduard Baltin: Presiding Reluctantly over the Fleet's Division," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 13, 1995, p. 32.
50. See, e.g., "I snova predstormovaya pogoda," *Rossiya*, 12-18 May 1993.
51. *Interfax*, 14 October 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-199
52. "Ethnic Turmoil Tears Apart Armed Forces," *The Independent*, 12 January 1992. At this point, Admiral Kasatonov stated that Ukrainians accounted for 19% of the officers and 30% of the seamen and petty officers of the BSF. "Troops Begin to Take the Oath on Ukrainian Territory," *Izvestiya*, 7 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-004.
53. Two other positions that may also be identified above all with the policies of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the winner of the Duma election four months earlier, also scored particularly well in the military. The first was the elimination of the current ethno-territorial divisions of the state for one of a territorial-administrative system. Here, the officers were among the top categories, scoring 26%, compared with the average 14%. The position that Russia should be "cleansed" of aliens (*inorodtsy*) was supported more by officers than by any other group: 23% versus the 16% average. I. Klyamkin, V. Lapkin and V. Pantin, *Politicheskiy kurs B. Eltsina: predvaritelnye itogi* (Moscow: Fond "Obshchestvennoe mnenie," 1994), p. 70-71.
54. Among typical left-wing categories, support for this idea actually increased; for instance, pensioners support for this idea grew from 25% to 32%.
55. *Ibid.*
56. "Ukraine: The Crimean Question," *The Economist*, 11 January 1992.
57. Ingemar Oldberg, "Vad hande med Svarthavsfloppan?" *Internationella Studier*, No. 1, 1996, p. 12. Establishing beyond doubt the details of the financing of the BSF is very difficult for several reasons; some sources claim Ukraine still made some contributions.
58. *RFE/RL Daily Brief*, 24 August 1994

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59. See Markus Ustina," Ukraine: Stability amid Political Turnover," *Transition*, 15 February 1995, p. 70.
60. "Black Sea Fleet—An Insoluble Problem?" *Moscow News*, 15 January 1992.
61. "Agreements Say One Thing, but Another Is Actually Done," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 February 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-042.
62. "O chem zabil mayor Astakhov," *Izvestiya*, 3 March 1992.
63. Peter J. S. Duncan, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians," in Graham Smith, ed., *The Nationalities Question in the post-Soviet States*, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1996), p. 201.
64. *Financial Times*, 11 July 1993, as reported in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993. World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 184.
65. TASS, 29 January 1993.
66. I. Klyamkin, V. Lapkin and V. Pantin, *Politicheskiy kurs B. Eltsina: predvaritelnye itogi* (Moscow: Fond "Obshchestvennoe mnenie," 1994), p. 70–71.
67. The post of JAF commander was abolished by the CIS defense ministers in August 1993.
68. "Igrat v politiku armiya ne namerena," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 17 March 1993.
69. "I. Kapitanets: Kak skazal Eltsin, "Chernomorskiy flot byl, est i budet rossiyskim," *Rossiyskie vesti*, February 1992. Reprinted in *Nesokrushimaya i legendarnaya. V ogne politicheskikh bataliy 1985–1993 gg.* Rossiyskiy nezavisimyy institut sotsialnykh i natsionalnykh problem (Moscow: Terra, 1994), pp. 328–330.
70. Moscow Russian Television Network, 16 March 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-052.
71. Mark Webber, *The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 185.
72. Creative intermediate positions were proposed on the way. By April, Shaposhnikov, as well as, e.g., Admiral Chernavin, spoke of Ukraine's obvious right to create its own navy. For that purpose, it should receive some 10–20% of the BSF, whereas the CIS should have the rest. See Ostankino TV, 23 April 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-080. In June, he suggested that the BSF might be divided up between all the CIS members, and that the other republics, less Ukraine, thereafter "delegate" their shares to Russia. See *RFE/RL Daily Brief*, 19 June 1992.
73. Mark Webber, *The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 185.
74. Dimitry Trenin, "Divide and Flourish?" *New Times*, September 1992.
75. *RFE/RL Daily Brief*, 10 January 1992.
76. "Glavkom dovolen rabotoy, provedennoy s presidentami," *Izvestiya*, 24 March 1992.
77. "Igrat v politiku armiya ne namerena," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 17 March 1993.
78. *Ibid.*
79. Radio Mayak, 6 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-004.
80. Radio Rossii, 7 April 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-068-S.
81. "Igrat v politiku armiya ne namerena," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 17 March 1993.
82. "Black Sea Fleet Is All Russia's, Yeltsin Insists," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 January 1992.
83. "I. Kasatonov: Prisyagu na vernost Ukraine, kak i drugim respublikam byvshego suyuza, ya uzhe daval". *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 March 1992. Reprinted in *Nesokrushimaya i legendarnay, op. cit.*, pp. 334–335.
84. See, e.g., Igor Shafarevich, "Oborona Sevastopolya prodolzaetsya," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 4 June 1993.
85. Pål Kolstø, *Nasjonsbygging. Russland og de nye statene i øst* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1998), pp. 253–254.
86. "The Navy Serves the Whole Fatherland," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 9 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-006.

87. "I. Kapitanets: Kak skazal Eltsin, "Chernomorskiy flot byl, est i budet rossiyskim," *Rossiyskie vesti*, 13 February 1992. Reprinted in *Nesokrushimaya i legendarnaya, op. cit.*, pp. 328–330. Kapitanets retired in April 1992, and was replaced by Admiral Feliks Gromov. See *RFE/RL Daily Brief*, 3 April 1992.
88. Konstantin Pleshakov, "Krym: kuda nas tolkayut glupye natsionalisty," *Novoe vremya*, No. 31, 1993
89. Natalia Belitser and Oleg Bodruk, "Conflicting Loyalties in the Crimea," in Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieers and Alexei Malashenko, *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p 72.
90. Kremen, Vasily: "The East Slav Triangle," in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe. The Emerging Security Agenda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 283.
91. "Chem budet Krym: yablokom razdora ili svyazyuyshchim zvenom?" *Kommersant-Daily*, 10 July 1993.
92. Vladimir Kovalenko, "Govaryat 'flot'—podrazumevayut Krym," *Izvestiya*, 29 May 1993.
93. Reported by *Ukrayina segodnya*, May 1994, quoted in Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security* (London: Chatham House Papers, 1997), p. 70.
94. *RFE/RL Daily Brief*, 25 October 1996.
95. Deborah Yarsike Hall and Theodore P. Gerber, "The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, No. 2, Vol. 12, 1996, p. 168.
96. Vera Tolz, "Conflicting 'Homelands Myths' and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1998, pp. 274–275.