

Marching to a Different Drum? Political Orientations and Nationalism in Russia's Armed Forces

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Since December 1993, elections have been 'the only game in town' for the legitimate transfer of political power in Russia. This fact has led politicians – and the Kremlin itself – to target military servicemen as a distinct part of the electorate. Indeed, the potential size and discipline of the military electorate has prompted many political players to treat it as an especially important part. At the same time, in a political environment characterized by a high level of confrontation, the very loyalty of those representing the state's coercive power has been seen as under threat. An assumption underlying many analyses of the armed forces' political sympathies is that these may be expressed in the future through extra-constitutional military intervention at some level of policy formation.

Authoritarianism and nationalism (expressed as imperial nostalgia and ethnocentrism) are relatively prevalent in Russia's population as a whole.¹ In a 1996 poll, conducted one month before the re-election of President Boris Yeltsin, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) asked a selection of citizens to give their position on a total of nine statements, each meant to identify a separate 'idea' of Russia. The position, 'Russia should become a strong and wealthy state securing the well-being of its citizens', was on top with 52 per cent support. In fourth place, supported by 21 per cent, was the statement, 'Russia should be a strong military power'. Sixth, with 16 per cent, was 'Russia should be a state for the [ethnic] Russian people'. Last, but still receiving seven per cent, was the proposition 'Russia should rise again as a strong military empire within the borders of the former Soviet Union'.² Similarly, authoritarianism is quite highly rated among Russia's voters, probably even more so in recent years than in the early 1990s. In a late-1999 poll, 45 per cent agreed that the people 'always need' an iron hand, while 27 per cent thought that power 'should be concentrated in one pair of hands now'.³ Given the multiethnic character of Russia's population, and the country's recent past as the dominant republic within a larger, authoritarian

state, findings like these tell us of a certain potential for conflict both within and around the Federation.

Theorists of civil–military relations tend to describe military men – irrespective of the type of regime they serve – as more inclined than the average towards authoritarianism, conservatism and nationalism.⁴ Most academic and journalistic conceptions of the Russian armed forces correspond to such a picture. At the same time, however, it is hard to find research that provides details on what exactly the military's political sympathies are, and how they diverge from those of the general population. As Eugene Rumer wrote of the last years of the Soviet army, 'whereas the reactionary leanings of many in the high command were well known from their increasingly open imperialist and nationalist rhetoric, the mood and political makeup of the largely Russian officer corps remained unknown'.⁵ Since then, a similar impression of the Russian military has been fuelled by the same category of actors.

On the other hand, others arguing that the military is merely 'a mirror of society' – a phrase often heard in Russia – have been able to point to the diversity of political views held by a large number of high profile 'soldier politicians'. This was particularly evident in the 1995 Duma elections, when military candidates running for elections included such politically diverse generals as Edvard Vorob'ev, Albert Makashov, Aleksandr Lebed, Lev Rokhlin and Boris Gromov.

What, then, can we say about the aggregate political sympathies of the military? Do military servicemen march to a different drum than the population as a whole? Do they maintain different political views? This article aims to identify traits in the political sympathies of military servicemen – with particular emphasis on the officer corps – that have remained relatively stable through the tumultuous 1990s. This aim will be pursued by examining sociological work conducted within the forces, statements and positions of individual military leaders, and reports and analyses of military voting behaviour in the four national elections that have been held since the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the process, issues related to the politicization of the forces will be discussed.

The conclusions that emerge from the analysis have an immediate bearing on issues of civil–military relations. Specifically, they suggest the overall direction of the military's influence on policy formation, and what changes could be expected in the case of military intervention in politics at a higher level than is now the case.⁶ The very likelihood of such intervention is also touched upon in the examination of servicemen's support for authoritarian or military rule.

The Military in Elections, 1991–93

Well before the USSR fell apart, it was generally acknowledged that the military was a major political force in society. The character of civil–military (more properly party–military) relations in the USSR is in itself a matter of scholarly discussion. Still, few would disagree that, regardless of the level of direct political involvement of the military in politics, placating the military was a dimension of policy formation in the Soviet Union. When, in August 1991, conservatives launched a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, it was not so much a military coup as a final desperate attempt by forces in both the CPSU and the power ministries to bring Gorbachev's policies to a halt. However, over the three days it lasted the real and potential importance of the military in politics was clearly demonstrated.

Even before this event, the military had played a role as an electorate in a free election. In the June 1991 elections in which Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the RSFSR, military men were particularly prominent among the candidates. General Albert Makashov (then commander of the Volga–Urals military district) came in fourth place as a presidential candidate. General Boris Gromov (deputy interior minister) was Nikolai Ryzhkov's vice-presidential running mate; they placed second. Above all, there was Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoi, who was elected as Boris Yeltsin's vice-president. By the end of 1991, the military was again courted specifically, this time as Yeltsin and Gorbachev stood up against each other over the future of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin won that battle, convincing the reluctant military that the formation of the CIS was the only way forward.

The stakes in the continuing struggle for the loyalty of the military were again clear in 1992–93, as tension grew between Yeltsin and his new opponents, the conservative Supreme Soviet and his own vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoi. In late September 1993, Yeltsin suspended both the Soviet and the vice-president. They countered, in turn, by suspending him and appointing Rutskoi as acting president. The following days witnessed armed clashes on the streets of Moscow, leaving perhaps hundreds dead. Then on 4 October, after a day of bombardment that left the parliament building – the 'White House' – in flames, the opposition surrendered.⁷

The October crisis changed things for the armed forces in several ways. It implied a sharp breach with the (admittedly never completely respected) policy of not involving regular military formations in domestic conflicts. It forced the military leadership to take sides in a conflict in which there was no obvious legal superiority of one side's position over the other and in which its own sympathies did not necessarily lie with the side that

prevailed. As a result of the confrontation, politicians and parties with whom many military men may have sympathized lost their voices and the dream of democracy in Russia began to fade as its leaders' lack of ability to compromise was borne out.

With political Russia still traumatized, elections to the lower chamber of a new federal assembly, the State Duma, were held in mid-December 1993. Simultaneously, a referendum was held over a new Constitution. The Constitution, which secured a very strong presidency, was approved by a small margin and with low voter participation.

The events of October 1993, however, did not signify the end of radical nationalism in Russia. On the contrary, the Duma election gave a springboard into high politics to the erratic nationalist-populist Vladimir Zhirinovskii. In the election for party lists, his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) was the clear winner, garnering 22.9 per cent of the vote.⁸ Significantly, reports held that the military voted for the LDPR in even greater numbers than the population at large. At first, the ministry of defence, which insisted that there was no way for servicemen's votes to have been recorded, denied the reports. But later the ministry contradicted itself, putting forward that 74 per cent of the servicemen had voted for the Constitution (which Zhirinovskii had also endorsed).

Yeltsin himself said that a third of the servicemen had voted for Zhirinovskii. However, more alarming figures emerged elsewhere. *Segodnya* reported that 43 per cent of Russian soldiers serving in Tajikistan voted for the LDPR, while others reported 'overwhelming' LDPR support from the elite Taman division which had played a major role in the storming of the White House two months earlier.⁹ A retrospective poll conducted by military sociologists in the first half of 1994 gave more specific figures for the vote: among military servicemen, 23 per cent had supported the Russia's Choice bloc, while 38 per cent voted for the LDPR. Broken down, the latter figure showed that 45 per cent of all officers had supported the LDPR. All other electoral associations received 3–8 per cent of the military vote.¹⁰ Writing in 1996, the military sociologists Vladimir Serebryannikov and Yuri Deryugin gave an even higher estimate. They argued that 'more than 60 per cent' of the 'military electorate' had voted for the LPDR, and another 11 per cent for the Communist Party (KPRF).¹¹

Russia's Armed Forces: A Distinct Social Stratum?

In practical terms, it is easier to draw a line around military servicemen as a group than it is for many other social categories. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is equally straightforward to speak of the armed

forces as a single social stratum for political purposes. This section looks at the findings of accessible sociological work conducted among Russia's military men. It should be noted, though, that such works are scarce, particularly since 1994 when, because of the increasing degradation of the military and Zhirinovskii's support from the army in the previous election, a ministry of defence directive was implemented that prohibited regular sociological work in the forces.

Categories Within the Military

Not surprisingly, most of the opinion polls under review here were conducted among military officers. After all, it is they whose orders may make or break a regime in a standoff where different actors are vying for power. The political opinions of conscripts are a different matter. The time spent by conscripts in the forces is short and involuntary. While they may be concerned about the poor conditions that make military service miserable, they do not identify with the army in the way officers will tend to do. (Of course, the attitudes of conscripts are relevant politically as they may determine their willingness to execute potentially illegal orders in a situation where the military involves itself directly in politics.)

A number of surveys and analyses document a diversity of political preferences within the armed forces. These suggest that several distinctions may be made between categories of officers, each of which is relatively homogeneous in political terms. Such distinctions may be between high- and low-ranking officers; between younger and older officers; between officers serving in different branches of the armed forces; or serving in different geographic locations; between conscripts and those serving on a contract basis; and between those serving in more or less privileged units (such as those around Moscow) and those serving in deprived units.¹² Unfortunately, few if any polls among officers have maintained such diversification in the published data.

In particular, it seems reasonable to draw a distinction between older and younger officers. The former served for many years in the Soviet Union, when membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was practically compulsory, as was communist indoctrination. As early as January 1992, Deryugin identified two specific groups among the post-Soviet forces that were particularly inclined to act in solidarity with radical nationalist organizations. First were the 'orthodox, the most reactionary among the former high generals'; the other group was the poor officers, and the officers who had been transferred to the reserves.¹³ Whereas before the collapse of the Soviet Union older officers had greater prospects within the

armed forces than the younger officers have today, they are now in a weaker position should they opt to leave the military. By 1999, more than half of officers in the army had served in the Soviet Army and were members of the Komsomol (Young Communist League) or the CPSU.¹⁴ Today's younger officers, on the other hand, may well have entered the armed forces after the demise of the Soviet Union and, therefore, they feel less nostalgia, and less alienation from the current economic and social realities.

The Military's Political Sympathies

Are the military's political sympathies different from those of the population as a whole? And, if so, are the military's sympathies of such a character as to give cause for concern about the generals' direct intervention in politics or about the military's potential effect on elections? We now present some findings from sociological research. However, two points of caution should be mentioned. First, as noted above, a directive prohibiting regular sociological research in the forces is still in effect, which limits the amount and reliability of the existing information about political sympathies in the military. Although information about opinion polls among military men continues to appear from time to time, it is often provided by the ministry of defence itself and may thus reflect the political needs of the ministry as much as the real world. Second, we must keep in mind the shifting political dynamics of the nine-year period under review.

Political sympathies during the 1990s fluctuated not only in the armed forces but also in the population at large. For all the expectations attached to Boris Yeltsin during his early years, his time in power saw a remarkable deterioration of the armed forces and a consequent growth of anger directed at him from the military ranks. He is still considered a key architect of the 1991 Belovezha Treaty that signified the end of the USSR; it was he who failed to effectuate meaningful military reform; he who allowed the theft of state wealth, and projected the image of begging from the country's former enemies; in 1993, it was he who defeated his political opponents with the use of regular military forces; one year later he started the disastrous first Chechen War; and he allowed the enormous material deprivation of the forces and of the individual servicemen to happen, and so on.

By mid-1999, a new sense of optimism was growing in the country and in the military. We can identify a large number of reasons why voters, and in particular the military, should have attached such high hopes to Yeltsin's appointed successor, Vladimir Putin. He gave the military a new war in Chechnya and seemed to be winning with ease where his predecessor had lost. He gave his commanders a free hand to do what they thought necessary

to win, thus avoiding the conflicts that occurred in the first war when the commanders felt they were the victims of Yeltsin's and Grachev's incompetence. He supported the military at all junctures, adding his own lies to support those of the military command. He started to pay salaries on time, pledged to pay old debts, and promised those serving in Dagestan and Chechnya the same rate of pay as soldiers deployed with the UN. He increased procurements from military industry. And his broader policies suggested increased assertiveness in the international arena and more emphasis on military values in society. Among all these reasons, the war in Chechnya was without doubt the most important source of his popularity in the military. It is remarkable how different in terms of civil-military relations the dynamic of the second Chechen War is from the first.¹⁵

In a sense, the military's political sympathies for most of this period could easily be seen as springing from its antipathy towards the Yeltsin regime. However, that alone does not tell us which direction the military would be looking for alternatives. Would it be to the democratic opposition, centrists, or national-patriots? Moreover, it does not tell us what relative importance the military men attributed to each aspect of policy. Why, specifically, did so many soldiers vote for Unity ('Yedinstvo') and Putin in 1999 and 2000? And why, for instance, has a politician such as Vladimir Zhirinovskii enjoyed persistently high support among military men since late 1993? Before we attempt to answer such questions, we should consider some reported findings from sociological work.

An essential issue with regard to civil-military relations is the military's preparedness to intervene in politics. Questions related to this issue have been asked in several military polls in post-Soviet Russia. In early 1992, before Russia had formally set up its own armed forces, a poll conducted by the military authorities among 1,200 officers and NCOs throughout Russia established that as many as 90 per cent were against the military governing the country. At the same time, only 17 per cent supported the economic policies of the government, whereas 56 per cent disapproved.¹⁶

Another major poll of 12,000 servicemen (half of them officers) conducted by the military authorities between December 1992 and November 1993 revealed a high level of dissatisfaction. An overwhelming majority of officers were apolitical. The most politicized group was the officer cadets, and even they expressed only 12 per cent support for particular parties or social movements; among officers and NCOs, the figure was just eight per cent. These figures of apathy – or perhaps distrust in politics in general – stood in contrast to the finding that less than a third of the officers approved of the actions of the state.¹⁷

In April 1995 the newspaper *Izvestiya* published a poll of mid-level officers and servicemen, which gave some cause for concern about military intervention in politics. Significantly, while 23 per cent believed that the army should 'stay out of politics', 16 per cent thought the opposite: that the army should take on leadership of the country. According to *Izvestiya*, these figures showed that 'corporate' tendencies emphasizing 'professionalism' and 'keeping out of politics' were gaining the upper hand in military thinking.¹⁸ Others might disagree. The still considerable support for military rule is not reassuring and one could expect support for the military having exclusive control over military matters to be higher still.

Another 1995 survey by the US Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of 600 field-grade officers (from majors to colonels, thus excluding the more senior and presumably more conservative officers) found that only 5.2 per cent agreed 'fully' that 'Russia will need authoritarian rule to solve her problems' (32.5 per cent agreed 'somewhat'). As many as 78.5 per cent agreed that it was 'very' or 'somewhat' useful that citizens had the right to criticize the government, while the existence of a strong system of political parties was seen as 'fully useful' by only 3.4 per cent, and 'somewhat useful' by 36.7 per cent.¹⁹

The most thought-provoking poll that this author has found is to be treated with some caution; it was reported by a local newspaper in the North Caucasian city of Stavropol. According to this poll of officers and cadets of the local garrison, more than a third sympathized with communists and national-patriots. As many as 42 per cent agreed that the army should influence the political life of the country. Thirty-seven per cent of cadets and 42 per cent of officers considered that the military should be represented in the organs of power in order to assert their interests. And 31.4 per cent of cadets and 30 per cent of officers felt that the military must take into their hands the power and responsibility for the fate of the country.²⁰ While these figures are not necessarily reliable, they may be. That, in turn, does not necessarily tell the truth about the military as a whole. Notably, Stavropol is perhaps the city where the influence of radical nationalists among military men is the strongest. Numerous reports tell of fraternization between mid-level officers and representatives of Aleksandr Barkashov's RNE, for example.²¹

It appears that fewer polls have been published that deal directly with the military's attitude towards issues of nationality and restoration of the Soviet Union. A comparison of four polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation from autumn 1992 to spring 1994 shows that military support for the establishment of a centralized state on the territory of the former

Soviet Union was declining; in fact, it was lower than the population average. In autumn 1992, 19 per cent supported this idea, and by spring 1994, the figure was 15 per cent; for the population as a whole, the figures were 19 per cent and 21 per cent respectively.²²

In another 1994 poll, officers were not divided into sub-groups but rather were compared as a group with other groups in society. Officers came out on top of 11 other groups in favour of a firm policy in relation to states that were encroaching on the rights of Russian-speakers (61 per cent compared with 40 per cent). Paradoxically, officers also exhibited the highest preference for withdrawing forces from the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) (41 per cent against 28 per cent).²³

In the Lawrence Livermore poll, quoted above, a large majority disputed the legitimacy of the post-Soviet borders. Only 12.3 per cent agreed fully that 'the borders of the FSU are the borders of our country' (21.3 per cent agreed somewhat), but at the same time, only five per cent agreed fully and 32.2 per cent somewhat that the borders of Russia 'are completely just'; 49.8 per cent 'fully' and 31.4 per cent 'somewhat' supported the idea of reunification with Ukraine; for Belarus the figures were slightly higher, with 59.6 per cent expressing full and 30.7 per cent somewhat support; and for Kazakhstan the figures were 40.1 per cent full and 41.0 per cent somewhat supporting reunification. These figures suggest a strong sense of cultural proximity to other East Slavs (and the ethnic Russian population of northern Kazakhstan).²⁴

According to the military analyst Vladimir Mukhin, this proximity to the East Slav states plays an important role in deciding how officers vote. By his account in 1999, every third officer in the Russian Army is from Ukraine or Belarus. A similar number of officers are married to women from the 'near abroad'. As their links with home are very difficult, these members of the military electorate will vote for candidates who promote reunification of the Slavic successor states of the USSR. Yeltsin tried to exploit this motivation by promoting union with Belarus, but he was not much trusted to be the one to make reunification happen.²⁵

This may indeed be one mechanism at play in military voting choices. However, other sources indicate that the percentage of Ukrainians and Belarusians is lower than Mukhin's estimate. According to *Obshchaya gazeta*, ethnic Russians accounted for 79.7 per cent of all officers and 73.1 per cent of NCOs in the armed forces; the second largest group were Ukrainians with 11.7 and 15.5 per cent of officers and NCOs respectively.²⁶ *Argumenty i fakty* cited identical figures for Russians and Ukrainians and reported that 3.8 per cent of servicemen were Belarusians.²⁷

Polls regarding the military's specific party or candidate preferences have tended to show a higher than average support for leaders such as Rutskoi, Lebed and Zhirinovskii. In the 1994 poll noted above, nine per cent supported the social-democrats (compared with four per cent in the population); eight per cent supported the LDPR (four per cent); and five per cent supported the national-patriots (one per cent). Officers were close to the average in support of the communists (11 per cent against 12 per cent in the population), but were on the low end in relation to the democrats (17 per cent compared with 20 per cent). The officers showed higher support than any other group for Zhirinovskii (12 per cent against seven per cent); they were also on top in support for Rutskoi (13 compared with eight per cent).²⁸

According to a document prepared by the ministry of defence cited in *Moskovskie novosti*, shortly before the 1995 Duma election 25 per cent of officers preferred the KPRF, while the LDPR had the support of about 20 per cent. In third place was Our Home is Russia (NDR), followed by the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) and Yabloko, all of which had some 10–15 per cent support. Among specific party leaders, Lebed was in the lead with Rutskoi a close second, followed by Zhirinovskii.²⁹ The latter figures for party support reflect the support at the time for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) in the population as a whole. What is more interesting is the trend for the military to support more than the average organizations whose leaders appear strong, clear and decisive.

If we take as a point of departure the politicians the military seem to prefer and examine the traits that are typically attributed to them, we may indirectly get some more information concerning their appeal. A 1995 VTsIOM poll, which asked which qualities were characteristic of different leaders, drew an interesting picture of political leaders. On intellect, Zhirinovskii was at the bottom with only nine per cent, while Lebed was second lowest with 14 per cent. On reasonability, Zhirinovskii was at the bottom again with three per cent, followed by Lebed with 19 per cent. However, on leadership abilities, Zhirinovskii was on top with 53 per cent, with Lebed next at 33 per cent. On the ominous quality of 'readiness to reach goals at any price', Zhirinovskii was a definite winner with 81 per cent; next were Zyuganov with 23 per cent and Lebed with 18 per cent. As Yuri Levada (director of VTsIOM) commented, these responses not only presented the image of the politicians in the public imagination, they also drew a portrait of the *preferred characteristics* of politicians to their supporters.³⁰ If this assumption is correct, it implies that the KPRF could have done better with the military had their leader not been the rather dull Gennadii Zyuganov. And it contributes towards an explanation of why Vladimir Putin (and Unity) did so well among servicemen.

The Military's Voting Behaviour in Elections, 1995–2000: The Size and Character of the 'Military Electorate'

After the 1993 election, discussions about the military vote were rife in the Russian and Western media. Presuming that military men and their sympathizers would vote differently from others, estimating the size of the military electorate became a major preoccupation of the media. What added more interest to the 'military electorate' question was the assumption that this category of voter was more disciplined as regards turning out to vote. Thus, in a situation with low turnout it would play a particularly important role in deciding the election result.

In the early 1990s the 'military electorate' was understood simply as the category of voters who could be expected to vote for a military candidate. In recent years, however, the meaning of this term has changed. Now, this category includes voters with a 'military mindset' who vote for candidates or parties whose programmes match their own sympathies. This extended military electorate has been estimated in a variety of ways by different analysts as including all military servicemen, plus troops of the ministry of the interior (MVD), the security police (FSB), border troops, federal agency for government communication and information (FAPSI) and so on, their families, military pensioners, and people associated with the military-industrial complex, and their families as well.³¹

Every estimate of the size of the military electorate has its own agenda. Almost without exception, the estimates have been very high. In spring 1995, the minister of defence, Pavel Grachev, calculated that the military electorate amounted to 60 per cent of the electorate in total. Grachev warned, 'our people know for whom they vote. They understand for whom to vote in their interest.'³² Serebryannikov and Deryugin have stated that the electorate 'united by a military consciousness' made up 'no less than 50 per cent of the voters' in 1995.³³ *Moscow News* reporter Aleksandr Zhilin cited confidential military analyses that also gave a very high estimate for the size of the military electorate. He counted 1.8 million servicemen and civilian employees, seven million family members, up to nine million personnel and their families in military industries, 20–21 military pensioners and their families, and two million Cossacks, to come up with a total of some 40 million voters. Added to this were another 10–15 million voters associated with the MVD, the FSB, the border troops and so on.³⁴ Other Russian media sources developed estimates in a similar pattern in 1995, counting two million men in uniform, their family members, pensioners, Afghanistan and Chechen war veterans, military industrial workers, and so forth.³⁵

Prior to the elections of 1999/2000, speculations of the size of the military electorate were again common. One report, pointing to an analysis of the 1996 presidential elections, suggested that it was almost 18 million people.³⁶ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*'s military correspondent suggested that the military electorate counted 'no fewer than 20 million'.³⁷ *Itogi*'s military analyst reported that at a meeting of the ministry of defence collegium it was claimed that servicemen and their families made up 5.5 million voters. Colonel General Vasili Volkov, a member of the Central Electoral Commission, spoke of ten million, apparently including family members of draftees.³⁸

The flaw of such high estimates is that they fail to acknowledge that voters have multiple identities. If having a 'military consciousness' means that one of necessity will 'vote militarily' then the highest estimates cannot be right. While the wife of an officer living with her husband in a unit in Tajikistan may be inclined to identify with 'military causes' and vote for the same party as he does, this cannot be the case for all those included in the military electorate. Family members of servicemen have their own lives, and things other than the service of their sons or brothers mostly define their living conditions.

Even the core of the estimates may be challenged. The total number of servicemen (estimated at 1.8 million in 1995) includes a large number of conscripts with no plans to make a career in the forces. They know well the problems of financing, corruption and so on, but are probably more concerned with their own problems such as service time, bullying, the potential of being deployed to 'hot spots' like Chechnya, and so forth. Perhaps the only conclusion possible about the influence of the military electorate is that, given the pervasiveness of military institutions in society, military considerations probably affect the voting behaviour of a larger part of the electorate than in West European countries with conscript armies.

The most direct way of gaining knowledge of actual voting behaviour of the 'narrow' and the 'extended' military electorate is from the results of the closed polling stations for military servicemen. While this figure would include only a fraction of the military voters in recent elections, from the results of the closed polling stations it is assumed that the vote of the entire military electorate can be extrapolated. Thus, they have lent support to assumptions of a distinct military voting pattern and the existence of a very large military electorate. As for assumptions of voter discipline, these were confirmed by reports by the ministry of defence after the 2000 presidential election that 96–8 per cent of army personnel had participated. That would account for at least two per cent of all voters.³⁹ If the 'extended' military electorate participated to the same extent, and voted in the same manner, this might indeed have had a major effect on the election result.

The Military Vote, 1995–2000

As a consequence of the unwelcome publicity surrounding the military vote in 1993, the Kremlin has since made certain that servicemen vote in open polls. Therefore, it seems nearly impossible to estimate the military's support for different parties. Before the 1995 election, it was reported that the ministry of defence increased the number of electoral districts with closed military polling stations, but later it reversed this policy,⁴⁰ and in the end only a small minority voted at closed stations.⁴¹ Since then, the policy of closed polling stations has been largely rejected, and in the 2000 presidential election only 160 closed polling stations were operated, according to the ministry – mainly in remote garrisons, on ships and submarines, at border posts and in units deployed outside of Russia.⁴²

The 1995 election was one in which winning the hearts of the military seemed particularly urgent. Two days after the election, the ministry of defence announced the dubious figure that 75–80 per cent of servicemen voted for Chernomyrdin's NDR. Since only a small minority voted at closed polls, this precise estimate should not have existed at all. It is also simply improbable: the divergence between the ministry's figures and independent estimates is remarkable. Reports cited by Timothy Thomas held that the real vote was probably about 20 per cent for the LDPR, while the KPRF and KRO took second and third place, the NDR garnered less than ten per cent.⁴³ Serebryannikov and Deryugin also cite experts to the effect that both the KPRF and the LDPR gained 20–22 per cent, KRO about 15 per cent, Yabloko 10–12 per cent, and NDR only seven to eight per cent.⁴⁴

As regards the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, citing unnamed sources in the ministry of defence, Mukhin said that some 30 per cent of the military voted for Zyuganov; Yeltsin got 25 per cent, Lebed 17 per cent, Zhirinovskii 11 per cent, and Yavlinskii five per cent. In the second round, Yeltsin gained some votes after joining with Lebed, but still won less than 50 per cent of the total.⁴⁵

For both the 1999 and 2000 elections the ministry of defence announced exact figures for the vote at closed military polling stations. For Russia's voters as a whole, 23.3 per cent voted for Unity. From the closed polling stations, however, figures reportedly ranged between 40 and 60 per cent. Half of all military voters in the North Caucasus supported Unity, as did two-thirds at the Plesetsk test range. Among Russian servicemen in Tajikistan the figure was one-third, while in the strategic missile forces it was 40 per cent. A comparison of voting behaviour broken down into the military and the general population shows some remarkable patterns. While 23 per cent of the general population voted for Unity, the military's overall

support was 48 per cent; 24 per cent of the general population supported the KPRF, while support in the military was a modest 18 per cent; the one party except for Unity that was more successful than average among the military was the LDPR, which gained six per cent of the population's vote but as much as 14 per cent of the military's. Taken together, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) gained some 15 per cent in the general population, but less than two per cent among the military.⁴⁶

As for the 2000 presidential election, a spokesman for the Armed Forces' Chief Administration for Educational Work reported on 26 March that at least 80 per cent of voters at closed polling stations supported Putin; Zyuganov finished second with seven to eight per cent, and Zhirinovskii came third with five to eight per cent. Ministry of defence sources also said that 87.3 per cent of Russian peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for Putin, seven per cent voted for Zhirinovskii, and some three per cent for Zyuganov. In the Black Sea Fleet, 86 per cent voted for Putin and 5.6 per cent for Zyuganov.⁴⁷

The question is to what extent these figures are representative of the voting behaviour of the military electorate in general. This question, in turn, has two parts. First, do voters at the closed stations vote similarly to other military men? Second, are the figures at all trustworthy?

Representativeness and Reliability

Russian military analysts do not appear to see any problem in extrapolating the vote of the larger military electorate from the closed poll results. As for the 2000 presidential elections, the ministry of defence reported that at least 400,000 people voted at the 160 stations in question. This included the local 'extended' military electorate, including family members, and civilian employees of the units. According to the ministry, voter turnout in the army and the navy was 96–8 per cent – the highest ever in post-Soviet Russia, representing at least two per cent of the total number of voters. *Nezavisimaya gazeta* suggested that voting patterns at the closed polls were likely to be similar to patterns in the armed forces as a whole, saying that the sympathies of the military electorate did not vary much from place to place.⁴⁸ Three months earlier, in the Duma elections, the number of active military voters at closed stations was the same. One reporter described the two per cent as 'a very representative sampling'.⁴⁹ Another analyst similarly concluded that how the army voted could be deduced on the basis of the data from the closed polls.⁵⁰

While the sympathies of the military may not vary much, there are still reasons why the results at closed stations may not be representative of the

military electorate as a whole. First, personnel in faraway places may be more subject to manipulation from their superiors. They may have less access to alternative sources of information and they may also believe that their vote may be 'traced' so they may fear voting other than as their superiors suggest. Indeed, prior to the 1995 elections the chairman of the Duma defence committee, Sergei Yushenkov (Russia's Democratic Choice), predicted that the military vote would depend on where it was cast: 'If they vote at closed polling stations, there is a great possibility to manipulate the election results.'⁵¹

On the one hand, political campaigning is prohibited within military units; on the other hand, commanders are obliged by law to make their men aware of the ideas of different blocs and parties. Consequently, it is possible that the men will tend to vote as their superiors do. Prior to the 1999 Duma elections, there were, in fact, reports that the Kremlin was leaning on unit commanders to make political educators agitate for servicemen to vote for Unity. Officers told *Izvestiya* how they had been told to emphasize Unity in their work and how they were given a sense that they were responsible not only for the campaign, but also for the election results.⁵² It was also reported that military districts received faxes telling them to reprint in unit newspapers an article that amounted to advertising for Shoigu's bloc.⁵³

In the presidential election three months later, the acting commander in Chechnya, General Gennadii Troshev, was less than subtle in his recommendations: 'I think soldiers have already made their choice. We know who is the one who, today, together with the military, is fulfilling this mission ... who supports us.'⁵⁴ A few weeks earlier, on the Defenders of the Fatherland public holiday, Troshev had been honoured by Putin and promoted for the second time in less than three months. In this respect Putin was no different from Yeltsin, who promoted all his main commanders only three days before the first round of the 1996 presidential elections.⁵⁵

Second, it may also be that the election results at closed stations are just less difficult to falsify. Certainly, election results in post-Soviet Russia have been disputed. Thus, in the 1993 election, the analyst Aleksandr Sobyanin caused consternation by alleging that several million votes had been falsified in order for the Constitution to be passed. Benefactors at that time were allegedly the LDPR and to a lesser extent the KPRF and the Agrarian Party.⁵⁶ More recent elections have also been challenged, not least the 1995 Duma elections in which more than 70 per cent of servicemen at closed stations outside of Russia reportedly voted for NDR. Some particularly suspect official figures regarding the military vote in 1995 were those reporting that Lebed's KRO received only 12.9 per cent of the vote among servicemen in Transnistria, whereas 43.2 per cent voted for NDR.⁵⁷

Probably the most unlikely results were those reported by the Central Electoral Commission from Chechnya. Among the 40,000 army and interior ministry troops stationed there, official figures held that 76 per cent voted for NDR. For the KPRF the reported vote was only 3.3 per cent, for the LDPR 1.3 per cent, and for KRO 1.6 per cent.⁵⁸ Given the intense aversion of the troops in Chechnya to the leadership in Moscow, it is extremely difficult to see these figures as representing the true will of the voters.

When *Komsomol'skaya pravda* visited troops in the Volgograd Military District, army commanders told them that a majority of soldiers and officers had voted for Lev Rokhlin and NDR.⁵⁹ However, many soldiers told the journalist that they sympathized with Zhirinovskii and Stanislav Govorukhin, but had been instructed to vote for NDR by political officers. According to the newspaper, commanders across the country had been informed that their future careers depended on what sort of vote they could come up with. As a result, the eagerness to report 'good' results was so great that complete results were being issued even before the polling stations closed.⁶⁰

Allegations of falsification have also arisen in connection with later elections. In 1996, international observers were particularly clear in pointing to instances of vote rigging in the republic of Tatarstan, and for the second round also raised questions about the 'remarkable turnaround of electoral support' for the two candidates in Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Mordovia and Tatarstan.

As for the official 1999 and 2000 election results – while these were even better for the party of power than in earlier years – analysts are less eager to declare them unreliable. Aware of Putin's popularity in the army, some concluded that for the first time in Russia, in 1999 a majority of the military electorate voted in favour of the party of power. One of the few to question the official results of the presidential election was military analyst Pavel Felgengauer, who pointed to a series of unlikely local outcomes. In Chechnya, where federal forces were at war with the locals, Putin still got 49.4 per cent of the vote. In Ingushetia, with hundreds of thousands of Chechen refugees, Putin got more than 80 per cent. In the Muslim-inhabited republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, he scored more than 60 per cent. 'The only plausible explanation for these electoral miracles is purported massive vote-rigging', concluded Felgengauer.⁶¹

While it is impossible to determine the exact scope of falsification that has occurred, these accounts certainly testify to the increase in politicization of the military over the past ten years. The protest votes, the pressure from commanders to vote in a particular way, the falsification of election results:

these are all indicators that what Huntington called 'objective civilian control' of the armed forces is in decline. Consequently, 'subjective control' has become more important for the purpose of keeping the military from intervening in politics.⁶²

In a setting where prominent politicians disagree even over fundamental ideas of what their country should look like, allowing the military's professionalism to decline is a dangerous game. Since 1991, Russia has seen a number of prominent generals coming out against the country's political leadership and defending their own right to enter politics. Most notable is the former commander of the 14th Army in Transnistria, Aleksandr Lebed, who said in 1994 that 'in a civilized state, you cannot force the military into politics even with a stick. It's another case here, where every question is a political one.'⁶³

Conclusions

What can we say about the political sympathies of the Russian armed forces? Is there reason to conclude that the military does march to a different drum than the population as a whole? Are they more inclined towards nationalism and authoritarianism than the average Russian? While keeping in mind the uncertainties that are attached to much of the material that has been presented and the fluctuations that have occurred over time, we still have grounds to draw some conclusions.

Military men are to a significant degree uninterested in party politics. For most of the post-Soviet years, few would describe themselves as supporters of a specific party. As for particular parties, blocs or candidates, one finding that comes from both opinion polls and election reports is a clearly higher support for Vladimir Zhirinovskii than we see in other groups. Candidates with a military background – above all Aleksandr Lebed but also, for example, Aleksandr Rutskoi – have enjoyed more support in the military than in the population at large. Their high regard in the forces also seems to reflect a military preference for candidates who exude decisiveness and strength.

Not surprisingly, the position that the military should be responsible for military policies gets more support in the army than in society at large. Few consider that the military should rule the country, but the number of supporters of such a radical position is still not comforting. This is a simple distinction but an essential one, and one that is often ignored.⁶⁴

Just about all political parties and candidates have tried to appeal to the military for its votes and loyalty. In the process, countless promises of money and support have been made. Populism is a prominent trait of the

policies of most parties in Russia and the military's plight is also a concern outside the armed forces. However, in making sense of and choosing among the parties, voters wishing to use their vote for the good of the forces need to consider more than just promises: they must make an assessment of trustworthiness. That is probably where Boris Yeltsin failed with the military in 1996 despite exploiting the powers of incumbency and making a promise as radical as the abolition of conscription by the year 2000.

Indeed, the antipathy towards Yeltsin is a very clear trait of the military. For a number of reasons discussed above, Yeltsin was seen as the destroyer of the USSR and its once mighty armed forces. One may or may not choose to believe the official reports of great support for the NDR and for Yeltsin personally in the 1995–96 elections. In any case, such results reveal the potential for manipulation of some sort and the willingness of the Kremlin to draw the military into politics for its own short-term benefit.

While the 1999 and 2000 results in the military are remarkable, they appear less unlikely if seen in the context of the opinion poll findings that were reported prior to the two elections. Admittedly, some question has been raised concerning whether the opinion polls themselves might have been falsified in order to build up support for Unity and Putin,⁶⁵ but it seems likely that enthusiasm for Putin was genuinely on the rise. Full control over opinion pollsters is perhaps something that Putin aims to establish, but it is unlikely that he had it at the time. In retrospect, what is most remarkable about the military's support for Putin is the way in which so many were led to believe that this leader could easily solve the problems and win the war that had haunted his predecessor and his generals.

Among parties, the ones that have suffered the most among the military for Yeltsin's failures are those termed the 'democrats', linked to names such as Yavlinskii, Gaidar, Chubais, Kirienko, Fedorov and Nemtsov. Yavlinskii's Yabloko party has kept some distance from these, but it too suffered badly among the military in the most recent elections. The SPS and Yabloko together gained only two per cent of the military vote compared with 15 per cent in the general population in the 1999 Duma elections.

At the same time, if we consider the more illiberal and radical nationalist organizations and candidates – with the exception of the LDPR and Zhirinovskii – there is really not much evidence to suggest that they enjoy great support among servicemen. National-patriots such as Sergei Baburin and Dmitri Rogozin, or the more radical Aleksandr Barkashov, Eduard Limonov and Albert Makashov, probably have more support in the military than in the general population, but this support is still quite small. The Movement in Support of the Army (DPA) might have been in a position to

change this picture somewhat, had its founder Lev Rokhlin not been killed in July 1998.⁶⁶ However, once the DPA became the vehicle of KPRF rabble-rousers Viktor Ilyukhin and Albert Makashov, its chances of becoming a major force disappeared. By December 1999, the DPA was little more than a mouthpiece for its two leaders' rabid anti-Semitism and it scored close to nil in the elections.

If we move beyond the points set out above, it becomes more difficult to reach firm conclusions about how nationalistic military servicemen are. Looking at positions on specific questions that serve as indicators of a nationalistic mindset is one thing; making conclusions on this basis about voting behaviour and support for parties or presidential candidates is something different. There are many problems in this respect. Which party choices should we consider primarily nationalist? The LDPR may seem a clear-cut case, but what of the DPA under Makashov and Ilyukhin? What about the KPRF? It has become quite common to describe Zyuganov as a nationalist, but a vote for his party is rarely seen as a nationalist vote. The philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko, himself a moderate nationalist of sorts, said in early 2000 that Putin's election win signalled 'the decline of all of the former political stars', and the KPRF's 'mission ... as a party of leftist patriotism lost its meaning because Putin embodies both patriotism and social ideals'.⁶⁷

In much the same way as Putin appealed to a wide variety of voters, including the particularly nationally minded, those voting for him had a variety of motives. To many voters, these motives to a greater or lesser degree also regarded issues that we may call indicators of nationalism. They may not have been decisive but they contributed to the vote for Putin. Any voter normally has several reasons to vote for a given party or candidate. He may indeed dislike his own choice for several reasons, but the likes may in the end override the dislikes. From what we know about the military's inclinations, what tipped so many in Putin's direction were his military policies, his patriotism, and perhaps the implied message of authoritarianism in many of his pre-election statements and actions.

NOTES

1. I define 'nationalism' in this article as a doctrine that emphasizes the importance of belonging to an ethnic group and promoting the interests of that group. Above all, such promotion may imply efforts to make the borders of a state coincide with those of the ethnic group, but it may also take other forms. The character of the nationalism may vary depending on, *inter alia*, its perception of other ethnic groups and its territorial aspirations. I consider that expressions of Russian nationalist sentiment may be placed in one of four different categories of which the most radical – defined by its potential to cause conflict – is the one

that combines territorial expansionism with ethnic supremacy. This model is elaborated in Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Raising "the Russian Question": Ethnicity and Statehood – Russkie and Rossiya', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.2, No.1 (Spring 1996), pp.91–110.

2. T.I. Kutokovets and I.M. Klyamkin, *Russkie idei. Na osnove sotsiologicheskogo oprosa 'Osobyi put Rossi',* vypuski 1–2 (Moscow, Jan.–Feb. 1997), p.2. Multiple answers were possible, so percentages do not add up to 100.
3. Nikolai Popov, 'The Quiet Appeal of Dictatorship', *Vremya*, 6 Dec. 1999, reported by RIA Novosti; poll by ARPI.
4. Among the classic works, see: Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*, Revised Edition (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1985), p.79; and Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), p.2. It should be pointed out that these writers' understanding of nationalism may not correspond fully with the definition presented above.
5. Eugene B. Rumer, *The Ideological Crisis in the Russian Military* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND/National Defense Research Institute, 1994), p.17.
6. Interpretations of the military's role in Russian politics in the 1990s differ greatly. One scholar wrote: 'Let there be no doubt, the military has intervened in Russian politics to the highest level described by Finer': Robert H. Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics 1991–1996', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol.10, No.3 (Sept. 1997), p.91.) As an example of this highest level of intervention he pointed to the October Crisis in 1993. More in line with this writer's views, others have pointed out that the military's siding with Yeltsin in 1991 and 1993 testifies more to the professional than to the politicized character of the officer corps: see, for example, James Brusstar and Ellen Jones, 'The Russian Military's Role in Politics', *McNair Paper* 34 (Jan. 1995), p.38. Others have tried to explain the absence of a military coup, pointing out that this would seem to be expected on the basis of the standard works on civil–military relations: see, for example, David Mendeloff, 'Explaining Russian Military Quiescence: The "Paradox of Disintegration" and the Myth of a Military Coup', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.27, No.3 (1994), pp.225–46.
7. Subsequently, they were detained and brought to the Lefortovo prison. They were freed in January 1994 by an amnesty granted by the newly elected Duma.
8. The leading democratic party, Yegor Gaidar's 'Russia's Choice', came second with a more modest 15.5 per cent. The only slightly reformed Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), led by Gennadii Zyuganov, came in third place, with 12.4 per cent. Figures are from *Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vtorogo sozyva* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 1996), p.131. Half of the Duma's 450 deputies are elected from party lists, the other half by majority vote in single-mandate districts.
9. James Sherr, 'Russia's Elections – The Military Implications', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Feb. 1994, pp.67–8; Thomas M. Nichols, 'An Electoral Mutiny? Zhirinovsky and the Russian Armed Forces', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.21, No.3 (Spring 1995), pp.328–30.
10. Aleksandr Zhilin, 'As Times Change, So Does the Military', *Moscow News*, 15 Sept. 1994. The poll conducted by the Humanitarian Academy (formerly the Lenin Military–Political Academy).
11. V. Serebryannikov and Yuri Deryugin, *Sotsiologiya armii* (Moscow: ISPI RAN, 1996), p.89.
12. Some of these distinctions are explored in Timothy L. Thomas, 'Fault Lines and Factions in the Russian Army', *Orbis*, Vol.39, No.4 (Fall 1995), pp.531–48.
13. 'Reformu sleduet osushchestvlyat' s koles', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 Jan. 1992. Notably, Deryugin even at this early stage noted that Vladimir Zhirinovskii was touring military institutions, finding quite a few people sharing his opinions.
14. Andrei Korbut, 'Armiya gotovitsya k vyboram', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 July 1999.
15. See, inter alia, Lyle J. Goldstein, 'Russian Civil–Military Relations in the Chechen War: December 1994–February 1995', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol.10, No.1 (March 1997), pp.109–27; Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Pavel Baev, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles* (London: Sage/PRIO, 1996).

16. Lt-Col F. Makarov, '84 Percent of Servicemen Consider that Social Tension Is Mounting', *Krasnaya zvezda*, quoted in *Russica Russian Press Digest*, 6 March 1992.
17. Alexander Zhilin and Tatyana Skorobogatko, 'Taking a Look at the Russian Army Today', *Moscow News*, 17 Jan. 1994.
18. 'For Whom Will Lt. Ivanov Vote?' *Russica Russian Press Digest*, 21 April 1995.
19. Here the significance of the context again becomes evident. At that particular time, the Yeltsin regime was so unpopular in the population and among the military that securing the right to criticize the government must have appeared essential: Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, 'The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol.12, No.2 (1996), p.164; Also Deborah Yarsike Ball, 'How Reliable are Russia's Officers?' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 1996, pp.204-7.
20. 'Tret' armeiskikh ofitserov gotova vzyat' vlast', *Vechnii Stavropol*, 4 Dec. 1996. As for party orientation, 47.4 per cent of the officers and 31.9 per cent of the cadets supported the communists, 10.5 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively supported the 'democrats', 17.5 per cent and 4.8 per cent the party of power, and 10 per cent and 12.9 per cent national-patriots.
21. For a journalistic account of a visit to the local RNE branch, where local army and interior troops men were giving combat training to youth, see N. Gritchin and B. Urigashvili, 'Russian Neo-Nazis Claim to Have Agents in all Power Structures', *Izvestiya*, 12 July 1997. Translation by *What the Papers Say (WPS)*, 15 July 1997. For an analysis of the strength of the RNE and its links with the military, see John B. Dunlop, 'Barkashov and the Russian Power Ministries, 1994-2000', paper presented at the Sixth ICCEES World Congress, Tampere, Finland, 29 July-3 Aug. 2000.
22. I. Klyamkin, V. Lapkin and V. Pantin, *Politicheskii kurs B. Yeltsina: predvaritelnye itogi* (Moscow: Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' 1994), pp.70-71.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Ball and Gerber, 'The Political Views', p.168.
25. 'O simpatiyakh "voennogo elektorata"', *Oborona i bezopasnost'*, 18 Jan. 1999 (in *WPS*).
26. *Obshchaya gazeta*, 11-17 Jan. 1996; reprinted in *Oborona i bezopasnost'*, 15 Jan. 1996 (in *WPS*).
27. 'Armiya v tsifrakh', *Argumenty i fakty*, 1996, No. 8. This report did not explicitly refer to these as 'officers'.
28. These figures of course lend credibility to the reports that the military voted in large numbers for Zhirinovskii in the Duma elections. The categorization of the parties is that of the researchers: see Klyamkin, Lapkin and Pantin, *Politicheskii kurs B. Yeltsina*, p.77.
29. After these followed Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii, and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin; it is notable that the KPRF leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, came way behind any of these in terms of personal popularity: see 'Armeiskie motivy', *Moskovskie novosti*, 12-19 Nov. 1995.
30. Yuri Levada, 'Struktura rossiiskogo elektoral'nogo prostranstva', in *Prezidentskie vybory 1996 goda i obshchestvennoe mnenie* (Moscow: Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya, 1996), p.26.
31. 'O simpatiyakh "voennogo elektorata"', *Oborona i bezopasnost'*, 18 Jan. 1999 (in *WPS*).
32. 'Military Vote Uncertain', *East European Markets*, 12 May 1995.
33. Serebryannikov and Deryugin, *Sotsiologiya armii*, p.90.
34. Aleksandr Zhilin, 'Armiya verit tol'ko armii', *Moskovskie novosti*, 3-10 Sept. 1995.
35. See, for example, 'For Whom Will Lt. Ivanov Vote?'.
36. 'O simpatiyakh "voennogo elektorata"'.
37. Korbut, 'Armiya gotovitsya k vyboram', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*.
38. Aleksandr Golts, 'Elektorat v kamuflyazhe', *Itogi*, 1999, No.49 (7 Dec.).
39. Vladimir Georgiev, 'Military Ensured Victory', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 28 March 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol.52, No.13 (26 April 2000), p.3.
40. Aleksandr Zhilin, 'Which Political Parties Will win the Russian Army's Hearts and Minds?' *Jamestown Prism*, 8 Sept. 1995.
41. Vladimir Mukhin reported that almost 90 per cent of servicemen voted in open stations: 'Za kogo golosovala armiya?' *Oborona i bezopasnost'*, Dec. 1995 (in *WPS*); Serebryannikov and Deryugin said only two per cent voted at closed stations: *Sotsiologiya armii*, p.90.

42. Georgiev, 'Military Ensured Victory'.
43. Timothy L. Thomas, 'The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections: Dissatisfaction Continues to Grow in the Armed Forces', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol.9, No.3 (Sept. 1996), pp.532-3.
44. Serebryannikov and Deryugin, *Sotsiologiya armii*, p.90. As for the electorate as a whole, the NDR won 10.1 per cent of the vote; the KPRF 22.3 per cent, the LDPR 11.2 per cent, and and Yabloko 6.9 per cent: figures from *Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vtorogo sozyva* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 1996), pp.87-8.
45. 'Why Putin Won in the First Round', *Defense and Security*, 31 March 2000 (in WPS). The same total for Zyuganov, Lebed and Zhirinovskii (58 per cent) was reported in Georgiev, 'Military Ensured Victory'.
46. Support for the OVR was 12 per cent in the population and seven per cent among the military: Andrei Korbut, 'The Army Voted for the "Party of Power"', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 25 Dec. 1999.
47. Georgiev, 'Military Ensured Victory'.
48. Ibid.
49. Korbut, 'The Army Voted for the "Party of Power"'.
50. Vladimir Mukhin, 'Voennosluzhashchie proyavili aktivnost', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 Dec. 1999.
51. 'Silnaya ruka. Drug voennykh', *Novoe vremya*, 10 Aug. 1995.
52. 'Golosui – ili promakhneshsya!', *Izvestiya*, 17 Nov. 1999.
53. 'Rukovodstvo Minoborony poluchilo ukazanie podderzhat' blok Yedinstvo', *Izvestiya*, 10 Dec. 1999.
54. AFP, 17 March 2000.
55. Ilya Bulavinov, 'Putin Bestows Awards – Generals Count Kremlin Stars', *Kommersant*, 22 Feb. 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol.52, No.8 (22 March 2000), p.1.
56. 'Sind die Ergebnisse in Russland gefälscht worden?' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 May 1994.
57. Lebed was the commander of the 14th Army in Transnistria in 1992-95, and was very popular among his troops.
58. TsIK statement quoted in 'Armiya golosovala po komande: "Volno"!', *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 19 Dec. 1995.
59. Rokhlin was a commander in Volgograd before going to Chechnya in January 1995.
60. 'Armiya golosovala po komande: "Volno"!'
61. Pavel Felgenhauer, 'Miracles, or Election Fraud?' *Moscow Times*, 30 March 2000.
62. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp.80-83.
63. 'Aleksandr Lebed: Sama zhizn' zastavlyayet generalov zanimatsa politikoi', *Izvestiya*, 20 July 1994.
64. 'The Russian military has strong, although limited, motives for intervention in politics in order to redress its grievances and attain better conditions', concluded Mikhail Tsypkin in a 1992 article: 'Will the Military Rule Russia?' *Security Studies*, Vol.2, No.1 (Autumn 1992), p.46. Similarly, the present writer, in a study of national identity of Russian officers, found that servicemen, although they may have sympathized with nationalist causes, would most often give priority to their own personal welfare: see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "You Take Your Oath Only Once": Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet, and National Identity Among Russian Officers', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2000), pp.289-316.
65. This interesting discussion took place on *Johnson's Russia List* in the autumn of 1999.
66. For an account of Rokhlin's radicalization and his political appeal in 1997-98, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Rokhlin Enters the Political Fray', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan. 1998), pp 14-17. About the controversies surrounding his death, see Andrei Rogachevskii, 'The Murder of General Rokhlin', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.52, No.1 (Jan. 2000), pp.95-110.
67. Alexander Tsipko, 'Another Russian Revolution Has Ended', *The Daily Yomiuri*, 6 April 2000.