



Inheriting the Soviet Policy Toolbox: Russia's Dilemma Over Ascriptive Nationality

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IN THE SOVIET UNION, the Communist Party leadership made a habit of boasting that their immense statehood was the home of individuals from 100 different peoples. And they would add that in the USSR 'the national question' had been successfully solved.

Well before the 1980s were over, it had become obvious that the latter was not true. Moreover, ever since the USSR ceased to exist in 1991, many observers have predicted that the Russian Federation will fall victim to the same development—a nationalistically driven break-up along the lines delineating the federal subjects. At the same time, however, several essential aspects of the multitude of peoples in the USSR and Russia have been mostly overlooked. Few have discussed how these peoples were in fact defined by the Soviet authorities, what motives lay behind the policies in this field and what specific consequences of these policies can be witnessed today in the new Russian state.

These questions—above all, the last one—will be the focus of this article.¹ The article will address them by discussing two contradictory positions that have been assumed in relation to a specific element of Soviet nationality politics; the so-called 'fifth point' (*pyatyi punkt; pyataya grafa*) which implied an obligatory identification of all citizens according to nationality (*natsional'nost'*—the Soviet/Russian term for ethnicity). The designation stems from the fact that 'nationality' was the fifth entry, following surname, name, patronymic and date and place of birth, on a wide range of official documents in the USSR—including the passport.

Victor Zaslavsky, in his 1982 book *The Neo-Stalinist State*, was the first scholar to pay significant attention to the fifth point and a related Soviet institution, the internal passport. Whilst some other experts have also discussed these phenomena later, their implications have not yet been decisively analysed. In recent years, one of the most sophisticated analyses of Soviet nationality policies and ascribed nationality has been made by Rogers Brubaker. He is very clear in his assessment of the Soviet policies:

The Soviet state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalised the existence of multiple nations and nationalities as fundamental constituents of the state and its citizenry. It established nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from the overarching categories of statehood and citizenship. In doing so, it prepared the way for its own demise.²

The contradiction between Brubaker's position and that of Zaslavsky becomes clear

when we juxtapose that statement with the concise statement by the latter that 'the Russian language and the passport system are the primary and most effective instruments of Russification' (in the USSR).³ In other words, Zaslavsky concluded that the Soviet policies in actual fact served to water down ethnic particularities, and prepare the way for a homogenisation of the population of the USSR.

In the following, I will first give the background to the internal passport and the 'nationality' entry in official documents, including the possible intentions behind their introduction. This section will be followed by an elaboration of the positions sketched out above. Next, I will relate to this some analyses that have been made with regard to the demographic trends in the Soviet Union. Thereafter, I will discuss statements made in a recent debate on the passport and the fifth point in the context of the earlier sections. By considering the positions of different political actors on the basis of these statements, I will draw some tentative conclusions on what consequences of Soviet nationality policies may be read into today's political situation in Russia.

The point of departure for my discussion is the introduction of a new Russian internal passport, where the fifth point had been eliminated. The issuing of the new passport, which will serve as the country's main identity document and should not be confused with a foreign travel passport, began in October 1997.

The fifth point and the internal passport

Ever since 1990 there have been plans to introduce a Russian identification document. With the breakdown of the USSR in 1991, of course, the necessity of replacing the 1974 Soviet passport became more obvious. Still, it took six more years before the document was on the table. And even after such a long process, the regime appears to have been taken by surprise by the negative reactions to the end product.

The most visible difference between the old passport and the new one is that the former's hammer and sickle have been replaced with the two-headed eagle—the state symbol of the Russian Empire. In terms of colours, the old 'communist red' has given way to a slightly darker red. Inside, the passport differs in that all features are listed only in Russian; in the USSR, several other languages were used besides Russian, in the corresponding union republics (for the subjects within the RSFSR, Russian was the only language employed).⁴ The change that has proved most controversial, however, is the elimination of the entry denoting the individual's nationality.

The internal passport was introduced in the Soviet Union in 1932. By then, social scientists and party administrators had already been working for some eight years in what Francine Hirsch has described as 'a spectacular effort to make sense of the USSR's mosaic of peoples'.⁵ A major element of this work was deciding which peoples should feature on the official lists of census nationalities and which ones should be merged with their neighbours or simply 'eliminated'.

The inclusion of the fifth point from an early stage served the multiple, partly contradictory, and ever-changing purposes of Stalin's and the Soviet state's nationality policies. On the one hand, motivated by the Leninist three-stage vision of the development of peoples, turned into state doctrine under Stalin—*rastsvet* (flourishing), *sblizhenie* (coming closer) and *sliyanie* (merger)—early Soviet nationality policies aimed at stimulating expressions of minority group identities. Notably—in

contradiction to the perspective that 'the more nationalism, the more trouble for the government', which easily springs out of traditional Western scholarly works—this was done with the clear intention of preventing secessionism.

During the '*rastsvet*' phase of Soviet minority politics, a large number of minority cultures did indeed flourish; for instance, a large number of peoples had written languages developed for the first time. In many cases, elements of 'affirmative action' were introduced, favouring titular peoples. Undoubtedly, this in many cases did serve to promote areas that were less developed.

On the other hand, the compulsory identification in the fifth point very soon began to serve as a tool in the repression of ethnic groups. During World War II entire peoples were deported; each individual identified as, for example, Chechen or Ingush on the basis of their fifth point. The ethnic Russians living next door were left alone by the secret police. What drew most attention in the West was the anti-Semitism that penetrated the Soviet system; with *evrei* written in the nationality entry, one became the object of unwritten rules limiting Jewish representation in a number of professions and institutions.⁶

Somewhat ironically, the often simplistic communist views of the potential of social engineering did not have any bearing on the introduction of the new passport. Certainly, when the passport was introduced, each person was permitted to choose his or her nationality. For the future, however, nationality was treated (if not clearly seen) as being passed on through blood: when new citizens were given their first passport at the age of 16, they automatically inherited the nationality of their parents. With parents of different nationalities, the youngster could choose to identify either with the mother's or the father's nationality.

This restricted choice would frequently lead to peculiar situations. Even the famous Soviet ethnographer Viktor Kozlov, who was required to quote his Lenin and could not appear too critical of Soviet policies, pointed to the weaknesses of the passport system: referring to press reports for back-up, he stated that this system 'approximates the actual ethnicity of many USSR citizens and in many cases distorts it, obscuring the true development of ethnic process, particularly assimilation and integration'.⁷

Academic positions

Brubaker's argument, indicated briefly in the introduction, is quite straightforward when it comes to the effects of the introduction of the fifth point and the internal passport. It is reasoned that these institutional steps virtually forced upon each citizen an ethnic awareness (and indeed an ethnic identity) which he might not otherwise have had. Thereby, a specific ethnic setting was 'fixed' and encouraged, and any change in this setting could only take place slowly. To Brubaker, the internal passport and the fifth point were not intended by the Soviet authorities to play the role they in fact did. Rather, it was 'an irony of history ... that nationality became and remained a basic institutional building block of the avowedly internationalist, supra-nationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet state'.⁸

Zaslavsky, on the other hand, sees other mechanisms in play. Whereas he does acknowledge that the passport/fifth point system established rigid boundaries between ethnic groups, Zaslavsky argues explicitly that it in practice 'leads to the *hidden*

cultural Russification [original emphasis] of those ethnic groups which, residing on the territory of the Russian republic, have their own territorial formations'. The reason, Zaslavsky writes, is that the quota system providing autonomous nationalities with access to higher positions on their territories 'effectively protects the interests of the new ethnic middle classes. The most educated part of the population thus readily accepts the Russian language and culture. Cultural assimilation is rapid among them, insofar as the national intelligentsia lacks the incentive to further develop its ethnic language and culture'. At the same time, the rigid passport system 'protects the ethnic group's middle class against competition and prevents many ethnic minorities from developing their own national culture'.⁹ In the end, if the entry for nationality is removed, these ethnic groups will stand naked and exposed to rapid assimilation: they 'will have lost all ethnic, linguistic and cultural characteristics'.¹⁰

The Soviet years

In the Soviet public censuses, conducted approximately every 10 years—the last one in 1989—freedom of choice was greater than it was with regard to 'passport nationality'. Nationality was a major element in the questionnaires, but the respondent could tick any box of his liking, disregarding what his passport said. Although most people still did tick the box that corresponded with their passport fifth point, the differences that occurred in retrospect serve to identify the demographic trends in the Soviet Union.

More than that, as Pål Kolstø has noted: 'since the basic trend in the ethnic processes in the Soviet Union was towards assimilation into the Russian group, great numbers of people, probably millions, regarded themselves as Russian without being registered as such'.¹¹ Thereby, the fifth point in many instances served to inhibit a complete shift of ethnic identity.

Whereas children in mixed marriages probably frequently opted for the denomination of the parent who belonged to what was perceived as the more privileged group, one can safely assume that the nationality regulations served to uphold ethnic diversity in the RSFSR and the USSR. Although in a state-wide perspective it was generally most advantageous to be of Russian ethnicity, the situation was frequently different in ethnically defined federal subjects—above all in the union republics. As Veljko Vujacic and Victor Zaslavsky have pointed out, one of the unintended consequences of this policy was an ethnic homogenisation in union republics, 'since even in cases of mixed marriages children often choose to be members of the titular nationality in order to be eligible for preferential treatment'.¹² It should be stressed that this was taking place mainly in the Union republics, and to a lesser degree in the RSFSR itself.

The extent of ethnic re-identification

A study of ethnic re-identification in the USSR between 1959 and 1970 illuminates the processes that took place: Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver found that the ethnic groups with the largest proportions shifting identities were ASSR-level nationalities whose official territories were located in the RSFSR.¹³ The two most extreme cases

are the Karelians and the Mordvinians, of which respectively 16–18% and 14–16% of the 0–38 age group had re-identified in this period. Notably, the groups that came closest to this level were also ASSR-level nationalities with official homelands in the RSFSR and with an Orthodox Christian traditional religion. The Chuvash, Komi, Mari and Udmurts were all estimated to have lost 6–10%. For the great majority of the union republics, on the other hand, the demographic study showed very small changes.

L. N. Terentova has produced some highly interesting figures pointing in the same direction. A table of the choices of passport nationality by teenagers from ethnically mixed families in the years 1960–69 shows very substantial difference in choices made between different categories. In the union republics, a majority of teenagers with one parent of Russian and one of local nationality would prefer the local nationality. This trend was very clear in the Baltic states; in Tallinn, 62% chose the local nationality and 38% Russian. On the other hand, teenagers living in Estonia with one Russian parent and one parent who was neither Estonian nor Ukrainian, would opt for Russian nationality 90% of the time.

In the RSFSR, the trend was different. In Cheboksary (Chuvash ASSR), teenagers with one Russian parent and one parent of local nationality would choose the latter in only 2.2% of the cases. As many as 97.8% opted for Russian nationality. Even in Kazan' (Tatarstan), 33.4% would choose local and 66.6% Russian in a choice between those two. Indicating that both identities were strong (but Russian the stronger), teenagers choosing between local and 'other' (neither Russian nor Ukrainian) would opt for 'local' in 74% and 'other' in only 26% of the cases. In a choice between Russian and 'other', as many as 90% preferred Russian nationality.¹⁴

Establishing the categories

At the outset, the decision to introduce the internal passport and the fifth point had many dimensions of 'social engineering' to it. One significant, administrative dimension was that of control; not only relating to ethnicity but also in a wider context. The internal passport and the fifth point for decades were closely related to the system of *propiski*—residence permits. In the conditions of the early 1930s the difference between living in Moscow and living in the provinces could mean that between life and death.

In terms of ethnicity, one may attribute to the Soviet authorities intentions to execute a policy dynamically shaping social groups, or conserving a particular ethnic make-up of the population. Zaslavsky quoted an official Soviet theorist on ethnic relations to this effect: the danger, he said, was not in the awakening of ethnic consciousness and feeling as such; rather, 'the greater danger lies in allowing such processes to develop spontaneously, without any guidance'.¹⁵

Whatever the real motives behind the introduction of the internal passport and the fifth point, the very fact that a person was not allowed to have two parallel identities, for instance, serves to express underlying assumptions and intentions of the Soviet authorities. Similarly, there were firm limitations on what identity one could claim. Francine Hirsch has tracked the development of the authoritative list of 'proper' ethnic identities in the Soviet Union. She describes how the initial list prepared by the

ethnographers, which reflected their wish to include as many nationalities as possible, was gradually shortened. This was a development which took place under pressure from the regime, which aimed at having economically viable territorial entities, and also felt embarrassed about the resilience of the cultures of 'less developed' nationalities. Thus, whereas in 1927 some 172 nationalities had received official status, a mere 106 were included in the 1937 list of '*natsional'nosti* of the USSR'.¹⁶ Some 66 peoples had disappeared. And within another year the development had speeded up: by 1940 the revised list included only 59 nationalities.¹⁷

Soviet ethnographer Viktor Kozlov somewhat apologetically explained the decline (especially towards 1939) in the overall number as caused 'on the one hand, by processes of ethnic consolidation ... , and [on the other] the development of a more precise ethnic terminology and a clearer demarcation of peoples from ethnic subdivisions present within, or merging with them'.¹⁸ In the 1959 census a total of 126 nationalities were identified. In the 1970 census the figure was 122; in 1979 it was 123 and in 1989 it was 128.¹⁹

The historian Yuri Slezkine, who examined the formation of Soviet nationality policy, has concluded that this policy 'was devised and carried out by nationalists'.²⁰ He described the 'Great Transformation' of 1928–32 as 'the most extravagant celebration of ethnic diversity that any state had ever financed'. The 'Great Retreat' which he and several other writers have identified, starting in the mid-1930s, in his opinion 'reduced the field of "blossoming nationalities" but called for an ever more intensive cultivation of those that bore fruit'.²¹

Before the 'retreat' of the mid-1930s Lenin's distinction between 'oppressed peoples' and 'oppressing peoples' or 'colonisers' clearly did influence the Soviet policies. Belonging to the latter group were, of course, the ethnic Russians. However, other peoples, too, were seen as 'former colonisers'. These included other numerically large groups like the Tatars (thus part of Bashkortostan is populated with Tatars), Yakuts (initially Yakutia was much smaller, while 'small-in-numbers peoples of the North' like Evenks and Evens had their own autonomous territories in what is now the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia), and others—basically the groups that were really settling new territories during the 18th and 19th centuries.²²

In identifying this number of ethnic groups the academics took several shortcuts—many certainly politically motivated—in order to keep the number of groups down (a political intention that grew in significance during the 1930s) and some groups out altogether. This fact was also pointed out in several newspaper articles in late 1997 by Valerii Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology at the Academy of Sciences. In 1992 Tishkov became Russia's first Minister of Nationalities. During his short tenure, Tishkov pursued a liberal programme aiming at the development of an all-Russian identity overarching (but not eliminating) other identities. He was critical both of local elites allocating privileges according to nationality and of those who demanded a complete abolition of national divisions in Russia.²³

In the above-mentioned articles, Tishkov—arguing in favour of the abolition of the fifth point by indicating how random ethnic classification can be—pointed out how perhaps another 150 identities might be claimed if the current debate over the fifth point should stir a race for acknowledgment. People might feel more like Bulgars,

Mishars, Kryashens, Kalmaks or Nagaibaks than Tatars; the Pamirs of Tajikistan have always felt themselves to be somewhat different from other 'Tajiks' and so on. The ethnic Russian group might also suffer, as millions would demand to be identified as Cossacks, a category never accepted by the Soviet authorities.

One consequence of the Soviet authorities' aim to keep the total number of ethnic categories down is that assimilation would take place between non-Russians on a local level. As the number of ethnic categories was reduced and most 'ethnic villages' and 'ethnic districts' were abolished as part of the shift in policies in the 1930s, individuals belonging neither to the Russian nor the titular nationality would find themselves drifting uncomfortably in a culturally and linguistically two-polar system. Today, people of non-Russian and non-titular ethnic background, such as the Mordva in Tatarstan, find themselves in such a position—they are 'not Tatars' for Tatars, and they are also *natsmeny* (belonging to ethnic minorities) for Russians.²⁴

Responses in the republics

The strongest negative reactions to the new passport have come from the authorities of some of the federal republics (Russia today is made up of 89 federal subjects; the greatest degree of autonomy is enjoyed by the 21 republics, which are all ethnically defined). The loudest voices have been those of the 'usual suspects' when it comes to self-assertiveness among these: the republics of the Volga region and the North Caucasus.

In particular, the political leadership and federal assembly of Tatarstan have led the way. This republic, where the conquest by Ivan the Terrible's troops in 1552 is marked as a day of mourning, ranked as the federation's chief troublemaker in the first few years after 1991. In 1994 the republic signed a separate treaty settling its relations with Moscow (later treaties, allowing different degrees of local power, have been signed by Bashkortostan and several other republics and regions), and this relationship has since been working reasonably well.

In mid-October 1997 deputies to the republic's State Council adopted a resolution suspending the issuing of the new Russian passport. In the Council's opinion, the lack of a line for 'nationality' was 'the biggest provocation in the history of Russia' and was aimed at destroying accord between nationalities in the country.²⁵ Some deputies spoke of a 'genocide' being unleashed, and proposed that a separate Tatarstani law on citizenship be adopted and a republican passport be introduced.²⁶

A few days later, Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaimiev expressed his support for the suspension, and stated that the passport, by not mentioning the nationality of the bearer, was at variance with the federal constitution.²⁷ In mid-November the Tatarstani parliament called for the introduction of a two-page insert to the new passport, mentioning—with the owner's consent—his ethnic origin in the official languages of the Russian republics. The republic's state emblem should also be printed on these pages.²⁸

Similar reactions have been observed in Bashkortostan, a republic which borders on Tatarstan. Nationalist rallies have been held, and mock passports have been burnt, protesting against the absence of the fifth point. The Bashkortostani State Assembly in early November passed a resolution to halt the distribution of the new passport.²⁹

In late November the parliament of Chuvashia, yet another Volga republic, ordered a suspension of the issuing of new passports. In a special statement, the parliament said that the new passport should have special pages which included, 'with the citizen's consent, his ethnic origin'. Basic information about the holder should be given in the state languages of Russian republics, and not only in Russian.³⁰

As for reactions in the North Caucasus, Mukhu Aliev, head of the Dagestan People's Assembly, promised an 'outburst of nationalist sentiments in the republics' against the elimination of the fifth point. In Ingushetia, President Ruslan Aushev said that '[we] in Ingushetia will try to see to it that nationality is indicated in the passport'.³¹ The republican parliament in Kabardino-Balkaria concluded that it was 'too soon to dispense with the "nationality" line, because our citizens haven't outgrown it yet'. Whether the parliament itself, as this statement might indicate, considered the fifth point to be an archaism, was not clear.) Negative reactions have also been noted from the North Caucasian republic of Adygeya, and from Birobidzhan, the far eastern Jewish autonomous *oblast*'.

Finally—and indicative that one's *natsional'nost'* still is politically relevant—it should be pointed out that some local forces in the North Caucasus have asked that the fifth point be maintained in order to save themselves from being identified as belonging to some other group. Specifically, in November 1997, it was reported that the Federation Council, the Federal Assembly's upper chamber representing the 89 federal subjects, had gathered in Moscow to discuss the new passport. On this occasion, the North Caucasian leaders pointed out that their citizens with the new passports could be taken for Chechens. While being Caucasian generally is a liability in Russia, being Chechen specifically is even more so. Many North Caucasian peoples have last names similar to Chechen ones, and the fifth point may be the only means they have to avoid becoming victims of anti-Chechen sentiment.³²

On this occasion, the Federation Council unanimously passed a resolution asking the president and prime minister to consider issuing bilingual internal passports.³³ 'Numerous members of the Federation Council, especially those representing multi-ethnic republics, view [the new passport] as an attempt at leveling out ethnic relations and erasing the ethnic features of different peoples', the resolution said.

Fears of assimilation

There are clearly more than one valid explanation for the republics' negative reactions to the new passport. Certainly, genuine concerns about the possibility of Russian assimilation of one's minority group do exist. With four out of five citizens being ethnic Russian, it can safely be assumed that, should the official classification disappear, a steady assimilation of the smaller peoples would take place.

As for state policies, the murderous deportations are not that many decades ago. Although such events are very unlikely to be repeated under the current regime and any regime likely to succeed it, ethnically defined subjects may find many reasons to mistrust the authorities in Moscow. In particular, of course, the war in Chechnya has shown to what lengths the El'tsin regime has been willing to go to preserve its own order in the Federation.

One specific point that should be mentioned in this context is the fact that the

Tatars and the Bashkirs, as well as the titular peoples of the republics of the North Caucasus (excluding Ossetia) are Muslims. Whereas these have a tradition of opposing Russian rule, El'tsin's recent flirtations with the Orthodox Church have probably not served to increase their trust in the current regime.

One might expect that past injustices inflicted on specific ethnic groups might cause individuals to wish *not* to be identified as belonging to these groups. The reason why this line of reasoning is not the dominant one in the public republican reactions to the passport is probably that the worst threat one can reasonably expect from Moscow today is the facilitation of peaceful assimilation of smaller peoples. In this context, the removal of the fifth point would not be seen as a sign of good will.

In Moscow and elsewhere, Russian nationalists speak loudly of how ethnic Russians continue to suffer under the 'affirmative action' that was introduced in the Soviet years, and of the lack of a separate territory and separate institutions for the largest ethnic group. The increased ethnification of politics in many federation subjects during and after the breakdown of the Soviet Union has intensified these feelings.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that there is an element of power play in the debates that are going on. As has been seen in many other FSU states, 'where you stand depends on where you sit'; if an ethnic elite has come to power, it will be in favour of maintaining ethnic identification, whereas if they are to a greater or smaller extent denied representation on the basis of their ethnicity, they will most probably favour the abolition of such identification. The exception in the former situation would be the radical case where the elite wished to implement a policy of forced assimilation.

Since indications of public (as opposed to elite) opinion on the issue of the new passport are scarce, it is difficult to speak with certainty about the opinions of, for instance, the ethnic Bashkir public on this issue. Gail Lapidus in 1995 concluded, on the basis of a joint American-Russian study, that 'national movements or movements for sovereignty within the ethnic republics represented not just a game of leaders ... but express attitudes which have broad support within the republics'.³⁴

Leokadiya Drobizheva, the leader of that project, concluded similarly that in the republics of the Russian Federation 'the elite and significant circles of the titular ethnoses still live on the wave of the explosion of national self-awareness, striving to exploit what they achieved in the 1990–93 process of sovereignisation'.³⁵ Relevant to our topic, ethnic Russians in the republics examined in the project showed significantly lower ethnic awareness than representatives of the titular populations. In Tatarstan, 27.2% of ethnic Russians confirmed that 'I never forget that I am Russian'; Russians in Tuva scored 37% and in Sakha 21.5%. The titular populations scored considerably higher: in Tatarstan 50.5%, in Tuva 71.5% and in Sakha 54.5%. Russians also proved to be, in Drobizheva's words, 'less ethno-accentuated' when relating to the proposition: 'It is necessary to feel part of a national group'. In Tatarstan, 39.9% of Russians agreed on this (titular population 57.1%), in Tuva 46.4% (79.9%) and in Sakha 37.4% (73.9%).³⁶ Despite increased domination of the titular population in the leadership of the republics, ethnic Russians to a significant extent support economic independence (*samostoyatel'nost'*) of the republics.³⁷

Polls conducted in 1998 confirm the impression of strong regional identities also

among Russians in the republics. When the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) asked respondents across Russia (not defined by nationality) what they considered themselves more—citizens of Russia or inhabitants of their *oblast'* or republic—29% chose the first option, while 35% chose the latter; 22% said ‘both equally’, and 9% ‘neither’.³⁸ One might add that a total of 65% of respondents in another FOM poll agreed that ‘ethnic Russians [*russkie*] should govern Russia, then everything will be fine’. Twenty-nine per cent disagreed with this proposition. Support was greatest among the parts of the electorate typically associated with communist and nationalist parties and leaders; those least adapted to the new realities, critical of the current authorities, with least education, lowest income, and those older than 50 years of age.³⁹

Countering claims that ethnic awareness remains high in the republics, Emil Pain, an acknowledged scholar and Russian presidential adviser on nationalities issues, concluded that the national movements in all of Russia’s republics had come to play a lesser role over the last couple of years. The statements by the leaders of national movements on the question of the fifth point in the passport were, he said, ‘comparatively limp and, most importantly, attracted little public attention’.⁴⁰

In any case, it can be safely assumed that public opinion on these matters is being constantly shaped in the political processes taking place at a national and a republican level. The character and intensity of national identity can be seriously influenced by elites, cultural or political. Time and again in the FSU, we have seen politicians aim to compensate for poor achievements in other fields by outbidding others in the field of nationality. The history of the former communist countries over the past decade provides a lot of success stories to inspire such attempts by frustrated elites.

Playing the national card

The risks involved in playing a ‘titular population national card’ in the case of Russia’s ethnically defined subjects, however, become evident when we consider the demographic composition of these subjects. In nine of the 21 republics, more than half of the population is in fact ethnic Russian. For instance, Russians made up 79% in Khakassia, 58% in Komi and 70% in Buryatiya. In these, titular nationalism has not played a great role in post-Soviet Russia. Even in several of the republics with nationalistic elites, Russians are the largest single group; in Bashkortostan they make up 39%, whereas the Bashkirs make up a mere 22%. In Tatarstan the Tatars numbered 49%, but even here the Russians made up as much as 43%.⁴¹

Whereas the large number of ethnic Russians in these republics may be a result of demographic changes over the past few decades, and these changes to some extent may have been instigated by the Soviet authorities as part of national rather than, for instance, economic policy reasons, the Russians living in these republics cannot reasonably be denied citizens’ rights on the basis of their ethnicity. This argument, of course, would be valid even if the Russians should be only a small minority, but strikes even harder when the somewhat privileged nationality is a minority.

In a society where certain privileges are already being allocated to individuals on the basis of their ethnicity, it is only a small step from arguing not only against privileges for a minority group but in favour of primacy of one’s own, larger, group.

Even a thinker as sophisticated as Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has used the demographic argument against today's ethnically defined republics: these, he argues, represent 'anti-democracy': 'Yes, the nation should control, administratively control, only the territory where it makes up a clear majority, and better, a qualified majority'.⁴² The Nobel laureate did not on this occasion comment on just how deprived of rights those should be who did not belong to the 'qualified majority' nationality.

Essentially, we are again confronting the proposition advanced by Lenin, that the nationalisms of 'oppressed peoples' are somehow more likable than those of the 'oppressors'. In reality, allocating political rights according to ethnicity only repeats an illiberal practice on a smaller scale.

Considerations in the centre

The reactions in Moscow to the new passport serve to highlight the wide ideological differences among mainstream Russian political actors. Whereas we have seen that the voices that have been heard from the republics have been favouring the continued use of the fifth point, this institution has both friends and enemies among Moscow's (mostly ethnic Russian) political life. Here, the debate over the new passport has brought about the most peculiar alliances, and the most opportunistic lines of reasoning.

Liberal co-existence; illiberal assimilation

As far as categorical support of the abolition of the fifth point is concerned, we find this in three of the parties represented in the State Duma: Grigorii Yavlinsky's Yabloko, then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's Our Home is Russia (NDR), and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's so-called Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). These parties each have their distinct reasons to support the regime on this issue.

Chernomyrdin's party is a highly heterogeneous and ideologically fluid entity. NDR has—at least before Chernomyrdin was dismissed in March 1998—been characterised by its unconditional support of the regime's policies. That being so, the party's position on most questions, and its justification of the position, can be expected to coincide with that of the regime. Yabloko is the most ideologically coherent party of the three. Yavlinsky, while having a clear populist touch, has time and again defended liberal causes at a cost. He can be safely trusted when he states that a man's nationality should be his own business only, and that this position springs from a genuinely liberal perspective.

That is clearly not the case with the ultra-populist-nationalist Zhirinovsky and his one-man party. In late October Zhirinovsky and leading Yabloko politician Vladimir Lukin, in an unlikely joint appearance, described the nationality line as 'barbarism'. 'No civilised country has such a thing. It is a violation of all international norms', they said.⁴³ Zhirinovsky, however, assumed the liberal position from a completely different point of view than the Yabloko leaders. From his erratic rantings over the last seven years or so, one of the points that have remained on Zhirinovsky's political programme has been the abolition of the current Russian federal system and

re-establishment of the tsarist system of *gubernii*—governorships. With Zhirinovsky's countless imperialist, racist and Russian supremacist remarks in mind, we can safely conclude that the LDPR leader is once again trying to appeal to the guts of the ethnic Russian *lumpen*.

Another Russian nationalist who earlier has made a point of eliminating the fifth point, is former vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi. When Rutskoi re-launched himself as a politician in 1994–95, he explicitly spoke in favour of abolishing the fifth point. Before Soviet rule in Russia, there was no 'national question', he claimed. Such a question could not arise, because there was no fifth point. 'Do you ask your friend, for instance, what nationality he is? If you are a decent man, you do not give a damn what colour his hair is, the slant of his eyes, and so on—right?'⁴⁴ Again, however, there is good reason to see this statement in the light of other aspects of Rutskoi's political platform: basically, Rutskoi (who is presently the governor of Kursk) is a hard-line nationalist. He may not be a Russian supremacist like Zhirinovsky, but he does tend to equate *russkii* with *rossiiskii* and even 'Soviet'; and he insists that 'the geopolitical expanse on which we live is Russian [*russkii*] land'.⁴⁵

In other words, the forces in the centre favouring abolition of the fifth point are doing this from very different perspectives. At one end of the spectrum are the liberal democrats (not those of Zhirinovsky's misnamed party), who are significantly inspired by Western practices. At the other end are majority group nationalists who wish to see ethnic differences (at least politically) neutralised.

Notably, furthermore, the wish to see ethnic differences politically neutralised may be prompted by two quite different motivations. On the one hand, given that such a process would obviously strengthen the position of the majority group, one motivation might be an ultimately supremacist wish for domination (given that this supremacism is culturally and not somehow genetically founded). On the other hand, given that neutralisation of ethnic differences would eliminate one source of political unrest and a potent fulcrum for political organisation, it would also serve the cause of the *gosudarstvenniki* and *derzhavniki*. To these, the cohesion and power of the state is the main concern. In real life, one and the same Russian nationalist will tend to carry both these motivations. The relationships between the two will vary and—since 'patriotism' is such a valued sentiment in Russia and nationalism is spoken of as such a vice—the former motivation may be denied.⁴⁶

Soviet nostalgia

Just as different actors have spoken in favour of the abolition of the fifth point for very different reasons, opponents of its abolition have also clearly diverged in motives. Duma speaker Gennadii Seleznev, representing the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) headed by Gennadii Zyuganov, justified keeping the fifth point by referring to the constitutional establishment of 'each citizen's right' to state his nationality, and played down the corresponding right not to do so. Thus, Seleznev proposed that passport-holders should have the freedom to decide whether they should fill in the space for nationality or not. 'Who does not want this to be mentioned? Who is afraid of his nationality?' Seleznev asked rhetorically.⁴⁷

This last comment in Russia has a rather ominous ring to it. Duma deputy Anatolii

Greshnevikov, representing Popular Rule, a nationalist faction close to Zyuganov, made it explicit: 'Russians do not have to be ashamed of their nationality while it is quite understandable that sons of lawyers are against such a clause'.⁴⁸ Zhirinovsky, who many times has made anti-Semitic remarks, has in fact been proved to have a Jewish father himself. His one-time comment 'my mother was Russian, my father was a lawyer' has become a standard phrase to hint that people are clumsily concealing their true origins.

As far as the communists' support for upholding the fifth point is concerned, this should not come as any surprise. Above all, the fifth point is a heritage from the 'golden years' of the USSR, and the KPRF is a party characterised by a strong nostalgia. In its 1997 programme the party describes itself as the party of 'patriotism, internationalism and friendship of the peoples'. Echoing Soviet proclamations, it promises to bring about a national policy 'based on the acknowledgment of the equal rights of nations, the historical responsibility of each people [*narod*] for the state entity of Russia, eradication of inter-ethnic [*mezhnatsional'nykh*] conflicts, all forms of nationalism and separatism'.⁴⁹ When Zyuganov's party is in favour of maintaining the fifth point, one explanation is that this is an instinctive reaction to a challenge against the Soviet heritage.

Moreover, the KPRF under Zyuganov's leadership has in reality represented a confused mixture of Soviet internationalism, Russian nationalism and pre-Soviet Russian imperialism. Before the 1995 Duma elections Zyuganov made sure to address the ethnic Russians specifically: 'The *russkii* people was the gathering people, the great power people, around which the Slav core formed our powerful and unitary state'. The fate of the 25 million ethnic Russians left outside Russia's borders after 1991 he described as 'my own, personal drama'.⁵⁰ In the light of this—although one may sincerely feel that the constitutionally defined right to state one's nationality is as justified as the right not to do so—there may be some reason not to accept the Communist Party's arguments in the passport case at face value.

While Zyuganov balances his *russkii*-centred statements with statements about the brotherhood of peoples in a way that keeps analysts in the fog, others try to do the same but fail more obviously to convince. One example is Sergei Baburin, a prominent, radical Russian nationalist and deputy speaker of the Duma. Despite his very clear ethnic Russians-first attitudes, Baburin has put a double modifier in the name of the organisation he is heading: in Russian, it reads *Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soyuz*—'the All-Russian All-Peoples' Union'. Baburin himself has said that in ratifying the name, the ROS leadership emphasised the word 'all-peoples', explaining that 'we are for the Russian [*russkii*] idea, but as a unifying, not as an ethnic idea'.⁵¹

Russian 'apartheid'

While minority group nationalists may advocate the maintenance of the fifth point because of fear of being assimilated into a larger group, *majority* group nationalists may end up with the same position, from the opposite point of departure: they do not want the blood of their presumably 'pure' people to be polluted.

Normally, only very radical majority group nationalists will express such a position publicly. The strongest of these groups in Russia today is Aleksandr Barkashov's

militant neo-Nazi Russian National Unity (RNE). This group claims that the Soviet regime pursued a 'racial programme ... so that the Russians would to the largest possible extent lose their national appearance and traits of their national-racial Indo-European—Aryan—genotype'.⁵³ Among the policies craved by the RNE is a prohibition of any encouragement of mixed marriages.⁵³

Another exponent of a similar position is former KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov, who was quite a prominent actor in the radical nationalist opposition in the early 1990s. 'We need a purely Russian [*russkoe*] solution', he concluded, referring to evils ranging from the 1917 revolution to El'tsin's regime.⁵⁴ Notably, the Russians-first position of both Barkashov and Sterligov is fed above all by a ferocious anti-Semitism.

The regime: in need of a cause

In many comments on the new passport the point of departure has been the statements in the December 1993 Constitution, a document hurriedly written by people close to El'tsin after the October showdown between president and parliament. In fact, the declarations here do not take us very far in terms of clarification. Indeed, it is tempting to see the relevant article, Article 26, as itself an expression of the Janus face of the fifth point. Seemingly accepting nationality as being potentially both an asset and a liability, Article 26 reads as follows:

Everyone shall have the *right to* determine and state (*opredelyat'i ukazat'*) his national affiliation (*prinadlezhnost'*). No one can be *forced to* determine and state his national identity. Everyone shall have the right to use his native language, freely choose the language of communication, education, training and creative work (emphases added).⁵⁵

Judging by the press reports, the bureaucrats in the presidential administration and the Interior Ministry who prepared the new passport were caught by surprise by the scope and intensity of the reactions to the elimination of the fifth point. The reports indicate that those responsible concluded without much ado that Article 26 left them no other option than to leave out 'nationality'.⁵⁶ This decision, furthermore, was not subject to much attention in the early reports on the new passport; these rather focused on the new colour, state symbol, and technicalities regarding distribution. Of course, one could speculate that the regime manipulated the coverage to minimise attention to this change. That would not, however, explain the silence from the numerous publications that do not feel obliged to serve the regime.

Probably the main conclusion that can be drawn with regard to the El'tsin regime's position on nationality issues is that it would rather keep away from them altogether. While El'tsin during his presidency has repeatedly shifted his position to match what seemed to be the public mood, he has not done so in any major way with regard to nationality matters in his own country. In relation to other FSU states, he has spoken for the rights of ethnic Russians (using a series of confusing terms). But in the case of the Chechen war, he never made ethnicity a point; here, statehood was always the focus. As George Breslauer and Catherine Dale have summarised, El'tsin 'did indeed raise the rhetorical stakes when challenged, but within broad parameters that were

generally consistent with the thrust of his earlier rhetoric of state-and nation-building'.⁵⁷

The President himself dealt briefly with the passport issue in late November 1997 in a meeting with his prime minister and the speakers of the two Federal Assembly chambers—the 'Big Four' forum. Faced with the opposition from both speakers—Seleznev and the Federation Council speaker, Igor Stroev—El'tsin easily opted for a slight revision of the passport design. After that meeting, Seleznev reported that the disputes might be settled with special supplementary sheets, where ethnically defined federal subjects could include the nationality line.⁵⁸ As a matter of fact, such inserts could probably be added without much formal difficulty since the statute on the passport allows for 'inserted elements' for certain purposes.⁵⁹ In that sense, the storm over the new passport may be calmed to the satisfaction of the ethnic republics without the need to alter the original design.

If inserts including 'point five' are introduced, this will satisfy the republican nationalist forces. On the other hand, all problematic aspects of *having to* list one's nationality are maintained. It is very likely that once a citizen of, for example, Tatarstan has had an insert added to his passport, he will feel a pressure towards stating his nationality there. When belonging to a titular population in itself qualifies one for specific privileges, the freedom of choice guaranteed by the constitution is no longer complete. The local elite will decide on the standard for their republic, and the Soviet system, with all its implications, will be maintained mostly unchanged.

The various consequences with regard to minority (or even majority) rights are thereby also maintained. New examples are added to the long list of cases where claims to self-determination do not definitely solve the problems of national *matrioshka* states. Furthermore, the opponents of the new passport may not be content even if inserts are employed: the question of the passport cover has not been resolved. It should be pointed out that the two-headed eagle is not only the state symbol of imperial Russia; it has long since been used as the state symbol of post-Soviet Russia, although it has not been finally approved as such by the Duma.⁶⁰ Should the pressure on the regime to change this build up further, one could envisage a bewildered process of public soul-searching on behalf of the new Russian statehood.

As a matter of fact, this process has already begun. In August 1996 El'tsin initiated a project which was to formulate a new 'national ideology' to unite all citizens of Russia: 'In Russian history of the twentieth century, there were various periods: monarchism, totalitarianism, *perestroika*, and finally a democratic path of development. Each stage had its ideology. We have none', he stated.⁶¹ It is very tempting to see this initiative as one aimed at trying to use ideational means to prop up an unpopular regime. As for the specific statement, it is suggestive of El'tsin's confusion that he not only equates regime type with 'ideology' but also in effect refers to 'democratic path of development' as a thing of the past. Which makes one wonder: where is Russia positioned today? And: is it in need of a path of development different from the democratic one?

The way things turned out, the commission established by El'tsin to deal with the issue quickly ran into the problem of how to spot a Russian idea. When this commission, headed by presidential adviser Georgii Satarov, presented its report after one year's work, it had in effect given up: The report bore the title 'Russia in search

of ideas. An analysis of the press'.⁶² Not only had 'idea' become 'ideas'; the report itself amounted basically to a digest of reports from liberal newspapers, and content analysis of these. In a sense, Satarov was right in his conclusion that perhaps the very search for a national idea is a key Russian national trait. However, this does not go very far in terms of binding the peoples of Russia together.

Conclusion

There is hardly any material available today enabling us to reach an ironclad conclusion on what consequences the introduction of the fifth point and the internal passport have had in the USSR and its successor states. This article has been an attempt to bring the discussion a few steps further, by taking into account the status of these institutions in the current Russian political realm. The new information that I have introduced can do no more than indicate positions, and even then only elite positions. A great number of possible mechanisms may be identified, shaping the proclaimed attitudes of elites in the provinces and in the centre. A simple but important question such as 'are the elites in the republics expressing nationalist views attempting to reflect a public mood, or are they doing so trying to shape that mood', probably can not be answered decisively.

Bearing these limitations in mind, we may summarise the above discussions briefly to indicate the direction of a conclusion. While the depth and breadth in the reactions to the abolition of the fifth point in the republics is still a matter of dispute, the voices that have reached the centre—representing the political leaderships of a long list of republics—have been in unison in condemning the abolition. According to Zaslavsky's interpretation, this would not by itself serve as any indication of the preferences of the public in the republics. According to Brubaker's interpretation, however, this seems to be a clear indication that there is a widespread feeling in the republics that the fifth point is benefiting the titular peoples.⁶³ This point is made given that we do not know the details of how, in these specific instances, what shapes what—elite attitudes or (perceived) public attitudes. Circumstantial evidence supports this latter position.

With regard to the federal centre, the positions of major political actors seem to make sense only in the context of Brubaker's interpretation. A politician like Yavlinsky would contradict everything he stands for if he viewed the effects of the fifth point as Zaslavsky does and still supported its abolition. Similarly, Zhirinovsky would hardly be in favour of the abolition if he thought that would slow down a process of Russification.

Of course, one might argue that some politicians in fact consider that the point has been reached where a swift homogenisation of the population would take place once all ethnic sluices were opened. However, this seems rather far-fetched, given the ethnic revivals that have taken place across Russia over the past 10 years or so.

It may also be added that Karklins addressed this specific issue in her 1986 book mentioned earlier. Even then, at the end of the tunnel of Brezhnevism, she pointed out—admittedly on the basis of very thin material—that at least some of the non-Russians seemed to have been upset over suggestions that the fifth point be abolished, when the internal passport was re-designed in 1974.⁶⁴

In sum, this analysis suggests that one consequence of the continued existence of the fifth point is that politicians, intelligentsia and others today have an easier task than they otherwise would, if they for nationalistic purposes should wish to give new, politically relevant, contents to 'hibernating' identities.

This is obviously a process taking place in many instances today not only within the Russian Federation, but also in the rest of the former Soviet Union.

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¹ The author would like to thank Tor Bukkvoll, Pål Kolstø, Anatolii Yamskov and the anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier versions of this article.

² Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 23.

³ Victor Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State. Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society* (M. E. Sharpe, 1982), p. 100.

⁴ In the Soviet Union, 14 of the 15 union republics were ethnically defined—as the homelands of Ukrainians, Latvians, Kazakhs etc. Only the largest one was not: the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Here the word used for 'Russian' was *rossiiskii* ('all-Russian'), as opposed to *russkii* (Russian in an ethnic sense). At the same time, however, this union republic was itself made up of a large number of smaller entities, of which many were ethnically defined. Only the ethnic Russians, who in 1989 made up 81.5% of the RSFSR population and 50.8% of the USSR population, did not have an entity allocated for them specifically.

⁵ Francine Hirsch, 'The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses', *Slavic Review*, 56, 2, 1997, p. 255.

⁶ Incidentally, one Jewish activist who in late 1997 spoke in favour of maintaining the fifth point argued that while the fifth point undeniably created conditions for ethnic discrimination, it also served as a deterrent to discrimination in that it forced the totalitarian system to adhere to certain 'percentage quotas' in e.g. employment and education. 'The absence of the "nationality" parameter would have allowed the system to reduce those quotas to zero', he argued. See Aleksandr Frenkel, vice chairman of the Jewish Association of St Petersburg, 'In defense of "line five", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 November 1997, quoted in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, XLIX, 45, 1997, p. 14. Another aspect of the fifth point, which by itself benefited the Jews, and also Germans, Greeks and Armenians, in the last decades of the Soviet Union, was that it in effect served as a criterion to decide who might have an opportunity to emigrate. This particular aspect, however, falls outside the present discussion.

⁷ Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 191.

⁸ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 32.

⁹ Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State*, p. 103.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Pavel Baev & Pål Kolstø, 'Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Union', in Sven Gunnar Simonsen (ed.), *Conflicts in the OSCE Area* (PRIO, 1997), p. 107. For an in-depth analysis of demographic developments in the Russian Empire and the USSR, see Pål Kolstø, *Russians in the former Soviet republics* (London, Hurst, 1995).

¹² Veljko Vujacic & Victor Zaslavsky, 'The Causes of Disintegration in the USSR and Yugoslavia', *Telos*, No. 88, Summer 1991, p. 123.

¹³ Barbara A. Anderson & Brian D. Silver, 'Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among Non-Russians in the USSR', *Demography*, 20, 4, November 1983, pp. 461–489.

¹⁴ Figures reprinted in Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR. The Perspective From Below* (Allen & Unwin, 1986) p. 38. It could be speculated that the outcome of these choices might have been different in rural areas. Ethnic Russians were particularly numerous in the cities in both the RSFSR and in the other union republics, and Russian nationality may therefore have been considered as a relatively greater asset there.

¹⁵ Stated by Mikhail Kulichenko, 1972. Quoted in Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State*, p. 96.

¹⁶ The term encompassed both *natsii* (nations) and (some but not all) *narody* (peoples). The distinction between these two was one of assumed development.

¹⁷ Hirsch, 'The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress', pp. 251–278.

¹⁸ Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*, p. 15.

¹⁹ Goskomstat SSSR, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR* (Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 3.

²⁰ Yuri Slezkine, 'The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism', *Slavic Review*, 53, 2, 1994, p. 415.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

²² I am indebted to Anatolii Yamskov for this point.

²³ For an analysis of Tishkov's programme as a minister, see Victor A. Kremenyuk, *Conflicts in and Around Russia. Nation-Building in Difficult Times* (Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 55–66. See also Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame* (PRIO/Sage, 1997).

²⁴ I am grateful to Anatolii Yamskov for making this point to me.

²⁵ 'Tataria Rejects Russian Passports—Because They Don't Have a Line for "Nationality"', *Kommersant-Daily*, 18 October 1997, quoted in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, XLIX, 42, 1997, p. 7.

²⁶ A bill on Tatarstani citizenship was indeed introduced to the State Council in February 1998, and was met with fierce opposition from Russian-speaking members of the assembly. See *Russian Regional Report*, 19 March 1998.

²⁷ 'For "Line Five", for the Cause of Peace—Heads of Republics Protest the New Russian Passports', *Kommersant-Daily*, 22 October 1997, quoted in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, XLIX, 42, 1997, p. 7.

²⁸ Itar-Tass, quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 15 November 1997, SU/D3077/B.

²⁹ Russia TV channel, 4 November 1997, quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 7 November 1997, SU/D3070/B.

³⁰ Itar-Tass, 29 November 1997.

³¹ 'For "Line Five", for the Cause of Peace'.

³² *Segodnya*, 5 November 1997, as quoted by *Russia Today*, same date.

³³ Interfax, 5 November 1997.

³⁴ Gail Lapidus & Renée de Nevers (eds), *Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Management in Russia Today*, (Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1995), p. vii.

³⁵ Leokadiya M. Drobizheva, 'Russkie v respublikakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii', in *Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniya v Rossii i SNG* (Moscow, 'AIRO-XX', 1995), p. 122. These findings are based on the same project as the book edited by Lapidus & de Nevers. The Russian researchers deal with the findings in more detail in L. M. Drobizheva, A. R. Aklaev, V. V. Koroteeva & G. U. Soldatova, *Demokratizatsiya i obrazy natsionalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90-kh godov* (Moscow, Mysl, 1996).

³⁶ Svetlana Ryzhova, 'Inter-Group Ethnic Solidarity in Conditions of Constitutional Conflict: Russians in Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan, and Tuva', in Lapidus & de Nevers, p. 68.

³⁷ Drobizheva, 'Russkie v respublikakh', pp. 123–124, 127.

³⁸ Fond Obshchestvennoi Mnenii (FOM), weekly survey no. 374. URL: http://www.fom.ru/week/t374_3.htm. Poll conducted in June 1998.

³⁹ FOM weekly survey no. 396. URL: http://www.fom.ru/week/t396_1.htm. Poll conducted in August 1998.

⁴⁰ *Rossiiskie vesti*, 31 December 1997, FBIS-SOV-98-007.

⁴¹ Graham Smith (ed.), *The nationalities question in the post-Soviet states* (Longman, 1996), p. 505. Readers with knowledge of Scandinavian languages will find a good discussion of this and related issues in Helge Blakkisrud, *Den russiske fôderasjon i støpeskjeen. Etniske og territorielle utfordringer* (Oslo, Spartacus forlag, 1997).

⁴² From Solzhenitsyn's address to the State Duma, October 1994. Reprinted in *Grazhdanin Rossii*, No. 21, 1994.

⁴³ Interfax, 24 October 1997.

⁴⁴ See 'Kontrrevolyutsiya voshla pod maskoi', *Pravda*, 4 February 1995; and 'Rutskoi', *Vechernii Novosibirsk*, 21 February 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-040.

⁴⁵ 'Aleksandr Rutskoi: "Ustavus's narodom ..." ', *Tambovskaya zhizn'*, 20 December 1994.

⁴⁶ For a discussion of different expressions of Russian nationalism, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Raising "the Russian Question". Ethnicity and Statehood—*Russkie and Rossiya*', *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, 2, 1, Spring 1996, pp. 91–110.

⁴⁷ AFP, 24 October 1997.

⁴⁸ Interfax, 24 October 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-297.

⁴⁹ 'Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii', in *Informatsionnyi byulleten'*, No. 9 (50), 15 may 1997, p. 17.

⁵⁰ Gennadii Zyuganov, 'Sovremennaya russkaya ideya—ob"edinyayushchaya ideologiya dlya nashei strany', *Duma*, No. 12, 1995, reprinted in Gennadii Zyuganov, *Veryu v Rossiyu* (Izdatel'sko-poligraficheskaya firma 'Voronezh', 1995), pp. 220–223.

⁵¹ 'K otechestvu', *Pravda*, 11 November 1993.

⁵² 'Osnovnye printsyipy postroeniya Russkogo gosudarstva', *Russkii poryadok*, 1994, 2–3 (15–16).

⁵³ 'Osnovnye polozheniya programmy dvizheniya Russkoe Natsional'noe Edinstvo po postroeniyu natsional'nogo gosudarstva', *Russkii poryadok*, No. 9–10, December 1993–January 1994. For a detailed analysis of the ideology of the RNE, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Aleksandr Barkashov and the RNE: Blackshirt Friends of the Nation', *Nationalities Papers*, 24, 4, 1996.

⁵⁴ Aleksandr Sterligov, *Nam nuzhno chisto russkoe reshenie*, 1993 appeal from the executive committee of the nationalist organisation Russian National Assembly (*Russkoe natsional'noe sobranie*), which he headed.

⁵⁵ *Konstitutsiya rossiiskoi federatsii* (Izdatelstvo 'OS-89', 1997).

⁵⁶ 'Battles over the passport', *Rossiiskie vesti*, 1 April 1997, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, XLIX, 13, 1997, p. 21.

⁵⁷ George Breslauer & Catherine Dale, 'Boris Yel'tsin and the Invention of a Russian Nation-State', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13, 4, 1997, p. 329.

⁵⁸ ITAR-TASS, 2 December 1997.

⁵⁹ 'Statute on the RF Citizen's Passport', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 16 July 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-157-S.

⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, neither the flag, national anthem or emblem which are in use today are formally acknowledged as Russia's state symbols. In late January 1998 the Duma refused to approve any of these. Communist, Agrarian and Nationalist deputies favoured a return to the old red flag, without the hammer and sickle. RIA Novosti, 23 January 1998, as quoted by *The Jamestown Foundation Monitor*, same day.

⁶¹ Itar-Tass, 12 July 1996, quoted in Breslauer & Dale; 'Boris Yel'tsin and the Invention ...', p. 303.

⁶² Gruppa konsul'tantov pri Administratsii Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Rossiya v poiskakh idei. Analiz pressy*, Rabochie materialy, Vypusk 1 (Moscow, 1997).

⁶³ At this point we are talking only about the members of the public belonging to the titular population, and not the ethnic Russians or the non-Russian, non-titular *natsmeny* residing in a given republic.

⁶⁴ Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR*, p. 32.